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A DARK AND TERRIBLE MOMENT:
THE SPANISH FLU EPIDEMIC OF 1918
IN NEW MEXICO
RICHARD MELZER

THE FIRST WORLD WAR was all but over by October 1918. The
Allies' final military drive was about to triumph as 1.2 million
American troops steadily advanced on a twenty-four-mile front in
the Argonne Forest. The Germans were in full retreat. By 26 October Charles G. Dawes could write from Paris tHat peace was
"near at hand."1 Americans were ecstatic. The entire nation awaited
news of the great victory over Kaiser Wilhelm and his hated German army.
But while Americans awaited the end of the war overseas, they
were suddenly attacked by a new enemy on their shores. The new
enemy invaded the United States via New York and Boston and
proceeded to sweep across the North American continent with
alarming speed and violent consequences. Twenty-six states were
invaded by the alien force within the first ten days of its attack.
Every state in the Union had been hit by the time Charles Dawes
predicted an end to the conflict in Europe. The enemy indiscriminately struck large cities, remote villages, and numerous military
encampments, leaving as many as 851 victims in one day in New
York City and as many as 4,597 victims in a single week in Philadelphia. More than ten times as many Americans were killed by
this savage force as were killed by German bombs and bullets in
the Great War. The country fought gallantly in its weakened state
after months of wartime sacrifice and hard labor, but the enemy
gave no quarter and knew nothing of peace negotiations or armistice. It called for nothing less than an unconditional surrender.
The enemy was the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918. 2
0028-6206/82/0700-0213 $2.40/0
© Regents, University of New Mexico
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The flu epidemic of 1918 has to be considered one of the worst
epidemics in history. Comparing the high fatality rate and the vast
area affected by this epidemic to afflictions of the past, a London
Times medical correspondent went so far as to write that "never
since the Black Death has such a plague swept over the world."3
It was estimated that one out of every five humans in the world
suffered from the flu in 1918 and 1919. More than 21 million never
recovered. In the words of the foremost authority on the epidemic,
"it killed more humans than any other disease in a period of similar
duration in the history of the world."4
The germ visited every corner of the globe, from Berlin, where
160,000 Germans succumbed, to the far-off islands of the South
Pacific, where the flu took its greatest toll in proportion to the
indigenous population. The rich and famous were as susceptible
as the poor and destitute: Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, King Alfonso
XIII of Spain, Cardinal Gibbons of Boston, heavyweight champion
Jack Dempsey, international banker Baron Lamber de Rothschild,
a future president named Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Gen. John
J. Pershing, Col. Edward House, President Woodrow Wilson, and
nearly every national leader in the Allies' camp suffered from the
misery of the flu in the fall of 1918. The epidemic was a worldwide
disaster. s
Considering the epidemic's global impact, it was only a matter
of time before New Mexico experienced the afHiction. New Mexico
was among the last states to be invaded by the germ, but neither
its sparse population, its normally ideal climate, nor its relative
isolation could halt the spread of the disease once it had crossed
into the Southwest.
Since the flu was slow in coming to New Mexico, one might
wonder if the state and its citizens were better prepared than other
regions of the country to combat the treacherous new enemy. Also,
what measures were taken to fight the flu and minimize human
losses in New Mexico? Did officials emulate other cities and states
in treating victims, or were unique methods of control attempted
here? How many New Mexicans contracted the disease and how
many died of it or of its feared companion, pneumonia? Was the
death rate higher or lower in New Mexico than in the rest of the
country? How did the epidemic affect the war effort in the closing
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months of the world conflict? Finally, were New Mexicans satisfied
with the public health care provided in this emergency, or did
officials suffer a wave of criticism that produced reforms in the
state's medical institutions and services? In short, what effect did
the epidemic have on· the future of public health care in New
Mexico?
These questions take on additional importance when one realizes
that histories of New Mexico are silent on the flu epidemic of 1918
although it undoubtedly claimed more lives than any other epidemic in the state's history.6 Historians of New Mexico are not
alone in this neglect. With the rare exception of works like Duane
Smith's Rocky Mountain Boom Town: A History ofDurango,7 other
state and local histories are seldom more informative. As Alfred
Crosby points out, only one major U.S. history textbook "so much
as mentions the pandemic. ':8 In addition, social histories of World
War I add little to our knowledge of the disease; the most recent
book on the period devotes no more than half a sentence and a
partial footnote to the epidemic. 9 What remains are three general
histories of the epidemic, a few doctoral dissertations, and several
small articles on the flu in the United States. 10 William Noyes's
description of the epidemic's history in the United States rings true
for New Mexico as well: the epidemic's history is a "misplaced" or
largely forgotten chapter in our national past:
News of the Spanish flu epidemic and its terrible de~th toll in
the East reached New Mexico in scattered reports competing with
news of the war and the Allies' impending victory. After months of
reading long fatality lists and uncertain news from the European
front, New Mexicans were eager for bulletins describing military
advances and hope of final victory rather than reports of additional
suffering from a strange new disease.
Even those who acknowledged the new threat tended to minimize its dangers to New Mexico. The Santa Fe New Mexican, for
example, claimed that with "our salubrious ... atmosphere" and
our great distance from disease-infected ports there was "little likelihood that the Southwest will be visited by the epidemical malady."11 The Albuquerque Journal meanwhile counseled caution
rather than fear. "The greatest danger," wrote the editor of the
Journal, "is from the panic of fear that is spreading over the country."
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The disease is "nothing more nor less" than the grippe, the] ournal
argued, and cautioned, do not "allow yourself to be frightened into
your coffin. "12 The arrival of Easterners who came to New Mexico
to escape the disease served only to reenforce this naive view that
calm thoughts and clean air would protect the Southwest. 13
But calm thoughts and clean air could not prevent the inevitable.
Although New Mexico was far from disease-infected seaports like
New York and New Orleans, nothing could stop the overland spread
of the flu. As the Raton Range noted, the Spanish influenza was
highly contagious, and "its advance has always been equal to the
rate and frequency of human travel. "14 Soldiers home on leave,
railroad workers, salesmen, traveling showmen, and, ironically,
even those who came to New Mexico to escape the flu were all
potential germ carriers.
It was in fact purported that Carlsbad and the southeastern portion of the state were first infected by the flu when an out-of-state
circus came to town on 8 October 1918. Several showmen suffered
from the disease, and one owner died of the illness during his
circus's stay in town. The Carlsbad Argus reported that once the
germ had arrived "it spread with almost lightning-like rapidity....
It was not three days before nearly every family and business house
of the city had one or more members down. "15 Learning of this
development, several towns, including Albuquerque and Pecos,
attempted to isolate their communities by "closely scrutinizing every
stranger who happened to get off the train." Those who came from
cities and states already affiicted by the flu were asked to "move
on" despite their strenuous objections. 16
Some towns took additional steps to prevent a more serious
epidemic. On 5 October Albuquerque's city commissioners authorized the local board of health to do everything possible to
contain the flu, including asking medical specialists be brought in
from the East coast, as if these doctors were not already overburdened with flu victims in their hometowns. Stores and banks were
shut down or kept open for only short periods in towns like Clovis,
Roswell, and Gallup. Hampered in this way, business and commerce were badly disrupted. 17
Other towns, including Taos and Dawson in the north, attempted
to fight the flu by insisting that every citizen wear a gauze mask

MELZER: SPANISH FLU, 1918

217

over his nose and mouth while in public. Many ridiculed the practice, saying that it did no good and looked foolish, but no one went
so far as to organize an Anti-Mask League in New Mexico as was
done in San Francisco. As a result, a great deal of the gauze material
previously used to make bandages for the war was now used for
the escalating battle at home. 18
As the number of flu cases began to increase in the second and
third weeks of October, city fathers throughout the state began to
realize that their earlier blase attitude and feeble initial attempts
to deal with the disease had contributed little to the preventipn or
cure of the terrible illness. Forced to take more concerted action,
schools, churches, courthouses, movie theaters, lodges, and dance
halls were closed for the duration of the epidemic in a majority of
towns and, after October 17, in New Mexico as a whole. Identifying
the flu as a "crowd disease," doctors and public health officials
cautioned that the best way to avoid the germ was to avoid crowds. 19
Responding to this warning, political leaders canceled most of
their scheduled rallies for the fall elections. Twenty-two conventionaires had already succumbed to the flu after attending the
Republican state convention in the early days of the campaign. 20
"A political convention," according to the Albuquerque Evening
Herald, "is about as unsafe a kind of public gathering ... as can
be imagined" in the current crisis. 21 The Santa Fe New Mexican
predicted that without political rallies candidates would be forced
to circulate pamphlets and printed propaganda "on a scale never
before attempted."22 The upcoming campaign promised to be among
the most unusual in recent memory.
Town officials also acted to prevent the spread of the flu germ
by instructing New Mexicans on the best ways to avoid the extremely contagious disease. Handbills in both Spanish and English
explained preventive measures, while lists of suggestions and rules
were regularly published in the press. The Raton Range published
the following "Ten Commandments for the Control of Influenza"
on 24 October:
1. Keep away from the sick.
2. Avoid crowds.
3. Do not use cups, glasses or towels that anyone else has used.

'.

OJ

Volunteer nurses parade in Santa Fe. Many ofthe same nurses who were mobilized
in the war effort helped to fight the flu. Adela Collier Collection, State Records
Center and Archives.

Alfred W. Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 1918, p. 65. Courtesy of Crosby and
Greenwood Press.
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4. Get all of the fresh air, good food and exercise you can.
5. Wash your hands frequently.
6. Avoid the use of sprays, drugs, etc. for preventive purposes.
They do no good and may do harm.
7. To protect your neighbor, cover your mouth and nose when
you cough and sneeze. Cough and sneeze toward the floor
or ground.
8. If you feel sick, when influenza is prevalent, go to bed and
send for a doctor.
9. If you have the disease, stay in bed until entirely well. Pneumonia may result from getting up too soon.
10. Help your health officer fight the disease. 23

Many New Mexicans religiously followed these commandments,
and no municipality was forced to resort to threats of fines and
incarceration for those caught sneezing, coughing, or spitting in
public, like those imposed in Chicago and in other parts of the
United States. Only the citizens of Las Vegas, New Mexico, were
subject to fines of up to twenty-five dollars if they were discovered
entering quarantined dwellings or places of business with more
than five customers on the premises at anyone time. 24
Next, town leaders in New Mexico responded to the threatening
flu by cooperating in a door-to-door search for nurses and an urgent
call for additional doctors. 25 With many physicians away in the
military, already overworked, or overwhelmed by the flu, doctors
were in extremely short supply in the state. 26 The Luna County
health officer, for example, was bed-ridden for a week by 15 October, Roy's two physicians were stricken by 17 October, and Dr.
J. G. Moir of Deming was said to be "desperately ill at his home"
by 18 October. Carlsbad's doctors often slept enroute while being
driven from stricken house to house, although this only weakened
their defense against the flu. 27 In a glowing tribute to these physicians, the Carlsbad Argus declared that "surely only a crown of
glory can ever pay them for their noble efforts in alleviating the
sickness of their fellow townsmen when they themselves were fit
subjects for the sick bed. "28
The demand for nurses was equally great. By early November
a Red Cross official lamented that "nurses are the scarcest thing in
the state today. "29 The Red Cross recruited nurses from as far away
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as Denver, Colorado, and even the inexperienced were encouraged
to volunteer their services during this medical emergency. Dozens
did, although several, including Sister Asmunda of Carlsbad and
Sister Alma Louise Vogt ofAlbuquerque, succumbed to the disease
they fought. 30 Meanwhile, with public schools closed and classrooms frequently converted into make-shift hospital rooms during
the crisis, many teachers signed on as nurses and received their
regular pay as compensation for their new duties. 31
Doctors and nurses were sometimes able to prevent the spread
of the flu with the help of a serum known as Prophylactic, which
had been developed at the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota. Although
the serum was used with considerable success in several eastern
mining camps, it was usually in short supply and seldom available
for long periods in New Mexico. 32 After a month of waiting for the
serum's arrival in Albuquerque, only 325 people could be vaccinated by late November. 33 Many other drugs and treatments were
concocted and advertised as sure cures for the flu. Medicine vendors peddled treatments with such unlikely names as Dr. Pierce's
Pleasant Pellets, Dr. Pierce's Golden Medical Discovery, Wizard
Oil, Foley's Honey and Tar, and Pe-ru-na. 34 In a typical ad of the
day, the manufacturers of Dr. Pierce's Golden Medical Discovery
advertised the virtues of their medicine in patriotic terms, claiming
that with their product New Mexicans had no reason to fear "when
fighting either a German or a Germ!"35
Simple home concoctions were also publicized. The Deming
Graphic, for instance, informed its readers that fresh lemons were
extremely effective agents against the flu. Concerned that this news
might cause a lemon shortage in the region, the Graphic prudently
asked the public to conserve the valuable fruit and resort to using
onions as a viable, albeit less socially amenable, alternative. 36 Others
recommended the medicinal advantages of whiskey, although this
"cure" may have been proposed by those who sought to postpone
the enforcement of prohibition, which began in New Mexico at
midnight on 1 October 1918. 37 Of course neither lemons, onions,
nor whiskey helped to control the epidemic, but they served at
least one important purpose in helping to calm nerves. The public
thus had the feeling that something was being done in a period
when little else seemed to be working well. 38
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But the public's nerves were not calmed for long. Some towns,
like Tucumcari, Albuquerque, and Raton, were extremely fortun-:
ate; few of their residents contracted the flu and died. Many other
towns, however, were devastated by the epidemic. By 17 October
the Gallup Independent went so far as to write that "the disease
has taken on such dangerous proportions here as to make it as
serious as the Bubonic Plague." Twelve hundred cases of the flu
and 150 deaths attributed to the disease were reported in the
western municipality by the end of the month. 39 Carpenters worked
day and night to keep up with the demand for coffins. The situation
was even worse in towns like Baldy, where the entire population
of two hundred residents was ill; in Belen, where more than half
the population was stricken; and in San Pedro, where forty-seven
of the small town's fifty citizens were down with the flu. Church
bells mourned the death of a new victim nearly every hour in
Socorro. 40 To make matters worse, New Mexico experienced its
coldest autumn and winter in more than twenty-five years as temperatures dropped to as low as thirty below. 41
A majority of New Mexicans lost at least one family member or
friend to the disease. 42 The fear and anxiety of the period was best
reflected in a rather primitive poem that appeared in the Raton
Range:
The flu has got my nanny;
I'm skeered as skeered can be;
If I meet a guy a-sneezin'
I just quiver like a tree.
I've had three shots of serum,
And I'm wearin' of the mask,
But if I hear the people coughin'
I fairly hustle for the flask. ..
I've lined out several boxes
For victims of the flu,
And you bet your bottom dollar
It makes a fellow blue....
So if there is a remedy
That overlooked have I,
Please give it me most quickly,
For I do not want to die. 43
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Every New Mexican shared these fears, but those of Mexican
and Indian descent were particularly anxious because they seemed
to be especially vulnerable to the disease. The Albuquerque Journal reported that Pueblo Indians were "dropping like flies" by midOctober. 44 Many other native Americans were stricken on the Zuni
and Navajo reservations. As one contemporary observer noted, the
disease swept the Indian country of New Mexico "like a grass fire .
. . . Every day some one told of deaths. . .. The survivors ...
were thin and weak and pathetic. They asked for medicine, the
strong medicine in the arm we had used for smallpox, or anything.
It was help they wanted and we could do nothing. "45
Mexican Americans were just as vulnerable. The epidemic had
been especially devastating in northern Mexico, where it was estimated that half a million Mexican nationals died of either the flu
or pneumonia. 46 Those who survived became dangerous germ carriers when they crossed the border as migrant workers during the
critical wartime labor shortage. Southern New Mexico towns, including Carlsbad, Clovis, Mesilla, and Deming, were particularly
hard hit as a result of this migration. In Carlsbad, the Mexican
American school was converted into a hospital and was "full to
overflowing" by 18 October. One hundred and thirty new cases of
the flu were reported "south of the tracks" in Deming on the same
day.47 As with every other immigrant group in the nation, these
Mexican workers usually suffered a much higher death rate than
those who were born in the United States. 48 Often the foreign-born
lived in close, overcrowded conditions, where it was almost impossible to isolate sick patients from other members oflarge, poorly
nourished families. Many deaths were, moreover, attributed to the
Mexicans' hesitancy to contact physicians because they lacked the
money to pay for a doctor or because, as illegal aliens, they feared
discovery and deportation. 49 Finally, many Mexicans succumbed
to the flu because they were in the prime age group to contract
the disease. Unlike other diseases that tended to claim the lives of
the very young and the very old, Spanish influenza was particularly
dangerous for those between the ages of twenty and forty-five. 50
As the Army's Surgeon General explained, the infection, like the
war, killed "young, vigorous, robust adults. "51 In New Mexico it
was estimated that more than 5,200 "young, vigorous, robust" Mexicans were prime candidates for the flu. 52
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The flu germ spread quickly among the Mexicans and, as a result,
among the residents of the communities they visited in New Mexico. The experience of Dawson, New Mexico, provides a tragic
example. Mexican nationals from the southern portion of New Mexico and the northern region of old Mexico had been recruited to
work in the Phelps Dodge coal camp. 53 Crowded into small temporary quarters, the migrants were particularly susceptible to the
spread of disease. Many died soon after their arrival in town. Dawson's' hospital, rescue station, and opera house were filled with
victims of the dreaded disease. School teachers served as nurses
in the camp's boarding houses where many unmarried male immigrants resided. Those who were well enough drove the sick in
ambulances to the hospital or the dead in flatbed wagons to the
cemetery. Seven or eight bodies were loaded on each wagon as the
dead were buried in mass graves dug by members of their own
families. Phelps Dodge officials closed Dawson's schools for six
weeks, shut down its business district for extended periods, required employees to wear masks in public, and kept four company
doctors on twenty-four-hour call, but to no avail. 54 The company's
annual report for 1918 counted seventy-nine flu fatalities in the
small town. 55 With an estimated population of six thousand, this
conservative figure meant that 13.2 individuals out of every thousand in camp died of the flu that fall. Only New York's 10.4 per
thousand and Pittsburgh's 10.0 per thousand came anywhere near
this average among the forty-six American cities listed in Alfred
Crosby's general history of the epidemic in the United States. 56
Having lost two of its residents in combat overseas, Dawson lost
at least forty times that number to the flu at home. This great
tragedy can not be blamed on the Mexican migration alone, but
probably the death toll would not have been as great in the isolated
coal camp if germ carriers had not been haphazardly recruited from
flu infected regions of the Southwest.
Unfortunately, Dawson's tragedy was typical of many other small
towns in New Mexico. Rural New Mexico was hit far worse than
the state's larger urban centers, despite a contrary trend in the
United States. 57 The Reverend E. J. Waltz could therefore report
that in rural Chilili "there was not a single home where there were
less than two sick and many times the number reached seven or
eight. In one home we found eight children lying on the bare floor.
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Three of these were dead and the others were so sick they were
entirely helpless." Mass graves were dug outside the village, but
Waltz still discovered corpses lying above ground "for want of a
burial place. "58
More urban centers, like Raton and Albuquerque, provide good
counter-examples to tragedy-ridden rural villages like Dawson and
Chilili. In Raton, only 1.2 deaths were reported per thousand
citizens compared to nearby Dawson's alarming 13.2 per thousand. 59 Albuquerque also fared much better than the remainder of
Bernalillo County; by the end of November the flu had claimed
almost twice as many victims in the county as it did in the city.
Albuquerque's hospitals had, nevertheless, been full since 7 October. 60 The total number of influenza cases doubled (from 75 to
159) by 10 October and tripled (fro~ 159 to 480) by 19 October
(see Table 1). Despite this rapid increase in the number of cases
reported, city leaders continued their earlier efforts to prevent the
spread of panic and fear by remaining overtly optimistic. The Evening Tribune stressed that "fear and unpreparedness" were the
major causes of the flu. Having "conquered" fear and prepared for
the worst, the newspaper's editors declared that the situation in
Albuquerque was "well under control" by 9 October. 61
Taking more concrete steps to fight the flu, city leaders banned
public meetings, discouraged coughing and sneezing in crowds,
and insisted on placards to distinguish quarantined homes. 62 Classes
at the University of New Mexico were cancelled indefinitely, and
the Chamber of Commerce's Bureau of Charity raised a thousand
dollars to help needy families stricken by the flu. 63 Also, city leaders
exercised extreme caution in deciding when to lift Albuquerque's
ban on public indoor meetings; the city did not want to repeat
Denver's on-again, off-again ban that served only to facilitate the
spread of the flu. Despite the pressure applied by those who could
profit from an early lifting of the ban, Albuquerque's city commissioners maintained their quarantine until 2 December, three weeks
after most other cities in the state had chosen to lift bans on public
gatherings. 64 Combining caution with at least outward calm, Albuquerque survived the epidemic better than did most other cities
of a similar size in the nation. 65
The number of flu cases and deaths varied, then, from towns
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TABLE I: Flu Cases and Fatalities in Albuquerque and New Mexico
7 October to 6 November 1918*

Cumulative
Number of
Flu Cases in
N.M.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 .
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
November 1
2
3
4
5
6

Cumulative
Number of
Dead from
the Flu or
Pneumonia in
N.M.

Cumulative
Number of
Flu Cases in
Albuquerque

Cumulative
Number of
Dead from
the Flu or
Pneumonia in
Albuquerque

23
75
100
159

October

180

7,371
7,477
7,565
8,525
9,241
10,199
10,613
10,893
11,674
12,101
12,976
13,650
14,344
15,007
15,255

237
248
280
335
410
456
540
567
599
683
777
854
918
1,009
1,055

460
480
500
550
573

69
79
85

91

923

167

*Estimated Total New Mexico Population, September 1918 = 350,000.
Sources: J. W. Kerr to City and County Health Officers, East Las Vegas, New Mexico, 4
November 1918, Lindsey Papers; Albuquerque Journal, 7 October 1918; Santa Fe New
Mexican, 12 October 1918; Ft. Sumner Review, 23 November 1918; Las Vegas Optic, 9
November 1918.
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like Dawson, with its large immigrant population and high fatality
rate, to places like the Los Alamos Boys' Ranch, with its very young
population and its record of no deaths during the flu epidemic. 66
Factors including age, crowded conditions, under-nourishment from
a wartime diet, physical exhaustion, ethnic origin, and poor health
facilities contributed to the spread of this "silent foe" in the state.
Any combination of two or more of these factors spelled almost
certain disaster to the residents of many communities. The absence
of these factors, on the other hand, meant a far easier time for
many New Mexico towns in the months of October and November.
The flu epidemic of 1918 would have been terrible during any
period of history, but its impact on the course of historical events
was even greater because it struck at a critical moment in the
concluding hours of World War I. With thousands ill from the flu,
work in the nation's shipyards and vital munition factories was
sharply curtailed, while the production of coal was "seriously hampered." The disease decimated military camps in the United States,
transport ships bound for Europe, and combat troops on the front
lines of battle. 67 Its death toll among American soldiers was "without
parallel in army annals. "68 Forty-one of the ninety-four New Mexico
troops killed in the war in fact died from the flu or of other disease
rather than from combat injuries suffered abroad. 69
This "great and terrifying menace" also crippled the war effort
in New Mexico. Draft calls were suspended for the first three weeks
of October as civilian doctors could not be spared to examine incoming troops. 70 The drafting of 405 additional males was delayed,
although 7,551 New Mexicans continued to serve in the Army as
of 1 November. 71 War bond campaigns were also affected by the
epidemic, although most of the funds collected in the Fourth Liberty Bond drive had already been raised before the worst days of
the epidemic. Towns like Dawson could; therefore, claim to have
exceeded their campaign goals by as much as 300 percent, despite
the flu and despite the news that the war was almost over in
Europe. 72 Open-air rallies, door-to-door canvassing, and Liberty
Bond parades, however, helped spread the disease. As Crosby
argues, the flu virus was "such an adept traveler that it really didn't
need the help," but it took full advantage of bond drives and pa-
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triotic rallies to make itself even more dangerous and more widespread. 73
Thousands of manpower hours were, moreover, lost just when
the war demanded maximum efficiency and productivity from all
citizens. Estimating that 400,000 Americans had died in the epidemic and that each would have worked an average of twenty-five
additional years if he had lived, Henry Moir told the Association
of Life Insurance Presidents that the epidemic had caused "an
economic waste of ten million years" for the United States. 74 Applying this formula to New Mexico, where approximately five thousand people died, the state could claim to have suffered an economic
loss of 125,000 years.
As a result of this terrible loss and other wartime hardships,
many New Mexico counties experienced acute shortages in essential supplies. Otero County, for example, reported a supply of only
twenty tons of coal, little food, and absolutely no surplus wool for
ten thousand people facing a winter of sub-zero temperatures.
Other counties were hit equally as hard; few could hope to ward
off an epidemic, much less contribute more to the war effort under
such adverse conditions. 75
On another front, New Mexico's largest military encampment,
Camp Cody, was hit by the flu, although it weathered the epidemic
far better than most forts in the country.76 Quarantined as early as
4 October, the camp reported 500 cases of the flu and 125 cases
of pneumonia, but only 21 dead among its 4000 troops prior to 23
October. 77 These figures skyrocketed, however, when 4,200 new
troops entered the southern camp in the succeeding 2 weeks; 2,237
new cases of the flu, 431 new cases of pneumonia, and 107 additional deaths were listed in these 14 days alone. 78 From an average
of approximately 5 deaths per thousand soldiers in the first 3 weeks
of October, Camp Cody experienced 13 deaths per 1000 soldiers
in the last week of October and the first week of November. Although Camp Cody was not hit as hard as other forts, it became
the target of rumors exaggerating the extent of the epidemic and
the number of fatalities. When it was rumored that 50 percent of
the troops were seriously ill with the flu, with hundreds of the men
"dropping like flies" each week, the camp's commander, Brig. Gen.
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James R. Lindsey, referred to such stories as vicious lies "deliberately started and kept in circulation by German propagandists."
The general went so far as to threaten to enforce the Espionage
Act of 1917 against anyone who dared to "afford great comfort and
encouragement to the enemy" through such lies. 79
General Lindsey was not the only patriot in New Mexico who
suspected German foul play during the flu epidemic. German agents
were, in fact, accused of bringing the flu germ to the United States
as a form of their notorious germ warfare. "It is generally accepted,"
wrote the editors of the Deming Graphic, "that the epidemic has
been spread by German agents, as it could hardly have traveled
so swiftly by natural channels. "80 Federal officials dismissed these
accusations as unfounded,81 but this did not prevent the postulation
of flu-related theories even more absurd and unlikely. On 9 November the Ft. Sumner Review relayed a theory that "the world
has been made ill as a result of 'a wave of hate.' " This mass hatred
had accumulated during the Great War and had culminated by
producing disease and suffering in the form of the terrible flu
epidemic. The epidemic would end, supposedly, when love and
peace had conquered hate and war or when the conflict was over
in Europe. 82
The war in Europe did end soon after the worst of the epidemic
had passed in New Mexico and just as the quarantine was lifted in
most sections of the state. After a month or more ofliving in rather
strict quarantine, New Mexicans celebrated their renewed freedom
almost as much as they celebrated the armistice itself on Tuesday
morning, 12 November. The excitement and relief of the time was
well described in the Deming Graphic:
When the sun rose on a perfect day, the town went mad. Sane and
ordinarily sedate men and women rushed about the streets, shouting, laughing, crying, beating each other on the back, waving flags .
. . . Every motor horn in town needed throat medicine before the
forenoon was half done, and each car, truck, wagon and horse was
decorated with the national colors of the Allies and these United
States. 83

This scene, or a similar one, was repeated in almost every town
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and village of the state. 84 The war was over. The flu was largely
conquered. The gloom had lifted. It was time to live again.
While the end of the flu epidemic produced joyous celebrations,
it also created great controversies in New Mexico. Not the least of
these controversies involved the state's poor medical health facilities. New Mexicans severely criticized state medical authorities
for their disorganization and general unpreparedness in dealing
with the recent epidemic. Mter the flu had "raged for months in
Europe," the Santa Fe New Mexican insisted, in retrospect, that
local medical authorities should have realized that the disease was
"bound to visit these shores in the course oftime. "85 Although ample
opportunity occurred to organize and prepare for the onslaught of
the flu, the New Mexico Public Health Association declared in
December 1918 that "the outstanding feature of the situation was
our absolute lack of health preparedness." The Public Health Association went on to explain that the State Board of Health was
"powerless to act when the epidemic struck us" because the board's
seven members
have no funds and no personnel at their disposal. They have a great
deal of authority, but no means of using it and there is no connecting
link between their board and the health boards of our various counties and communities.... Consequently, there is no standardization
of work and no interchange of ideas. They are exactly in a position
of a school board that has neither schools nor teachers, and no funds
to build one or employ the other. 86

The state had had to rely on the Rocky Mountain Division of the
International Red Cross and on Dr. J. W. Kerr of the U.S. Public
Health Service to coordinate the sending of medical personnel and
vital supplies to stricken communities. Fortunately, Dr. Kerr was
well aware of the state's public health problems because he had
completed a survey of public health conditions in New Mexico just
prior to this epidemic. Ironically, Kerr had concluded his survey
of September by stating that such an organization or state department of health was "essential and urgently needed."87 As the Public
Health Association lamented in proposing the creation of this agency,
"we will never know how many . . . friends, relatives, and fellow
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citizens .
were sacrificed as a result of the lack of an official
health organization, linking up the counties and towns of our state
for efficient health protection and the prevention of diseases. "88
Those who lobbied for the establishment of a state department
of health were especially critical of the methods used in collecting
and reporting vital health statistics in New Mexico. Noting "our
present slipshod methods of recording vital statistics," critics pointed
to an inability to collect data regarding births and deaths during
normal times, much less during crises. Dr. Kerr had found that
the State Board of Health had "no records whatsoever" while city
and county clerk records were "practically worthless. "89 Penalties
involving fines and imprisonment for not reporting births and deaths
were "practically a dead letter" because few officials ever bothered
to enforce them in most areas of the state. 90 As a result, Santa Fe,
with a population of nearly sixteen thousand, had only sixty-nine
officially recorded births in 1917, while Albuquerque had but one. 91
Kerr half facetiously remarked that in more than one city of New
Mexico "the mayor himself could die and be buried and the event
not be recorded as a part of the vital statistics of the community. "92
Critics concluded their case for the establishment of a new state
department of health by arguing that the recent flu epidemic had
merely highlighted the seriousness of a situation involving many
fatal diseases over a period of many, many years. It was estimated
that while 258 New Mexicans lost their lives "for the cause of
democracy against ... the 'Beast of Berlin' " from April 1917 to
October 1918, more than two thousand New Mexican children died
of preventable diseases during the same nineteen-month period. 93
A continued inability to record accurately much less control adequately the spread of disease in such "less enlightened communities" caused grave concern not only in New Mexico, but also in
the neighboring states ofArizona, Texas, and Colorado. These states
felt extremely vulnerable to New Mexico's afHictions as long as New
Mexico lacked the proper organization, data gathering methods,
and financial means to deal with its serious medical emergencies. 94
Without an efficient state department of health, New Mexico would
be known as the sick sister of the southwestern states, reenforcing
its prestatehood reputation as a less-than-civilized region. The fact
that New Mexico was the only state in the Union without a state
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department of health had become a great source of embarrassment
by 1918. 95 No one wanted a new state agency that would interfere
in an individual's "private life and home affairs," but an increasing
number of New Mexicans saw the need for "a state department of
health with. . . the means and the power to respond instantly and
effectively to every report of a contagious disease" in the area. 96
Pressured by this considerable agitation, the New Mexico state
legislature officially established a state department of health in a
bill enacted on 15 March 1919. The department was created to
serve as "the superior health authority of the State" with sufficient
power "to investigate, control and abate the causes of diseases,
especially epidemics." In addition, the department was charged
with the responsibility of carefully collecting vital statistics on all
births, deaths, and marriages. Putting teeth into the legislation,
lawmakers provided that state courts could fine an individual as
much as one hundred dollars for failing to report new births, deaths,
and marriages to the new department. 97
It would be a mistake, however, to argue that the flu epidemic
was the sole catalyst in the creation of a state department of health.
Dr. Kerr's critical public health survey of 1918 had had a considerable impact on public opinion and had received widespread press
coverage before the epidemic hit. Earlier reports by the American
Medical Association and by the U.S. surgeon general were equally
critical of New Mexico's public health program. The latter report
was, in fact, commissioned to determine why so many New Mexicans were rejected for medical reasons as recruits in World War
I. 98 One must conclude that while the flu epidemic was not the
only cause for the creation of a new department of health, the tragic
course of the epidemic helped to highlight the need for such a
department. The facts and figures on the poor state of public health
in New Mexico were all known prior to the epidemic, but the
epidemic showed how bad things could be in a serious medical
emergency.
The new department became an immediate source of pride and
"resulted in a great deal of favorable publicity" for New Mexico at
the national Red Cross convention held in April 1919: John Tombs,
who had been instrumental in the creation of the department,
proudly reported from the convention in Cincinnati that with its
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excellent climate and a modern department of health, it was only
a matter of time before New Mexico would "unquestionably" become "the healthiest state in the union."99
The epidemic had thus produced some good. Moreover, compared to many other regions of the country, New Mexico had withstood the flu invasion relatively well (Table I). Nevertheless, it
would be difficult to convince those who witnessed the death of
several family members and friends that their great loss at home,
at the very moment of victory overseas, produced anything but
grief, pain, and deep frustration in their lives. Despite its important
influence on the formation of a modern department of health, the
Spanish influenza was destined to be remembered simply for what
it was in the fall of 1918: a truly dark and terrible moment in New
Mexico history.
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H. B. FERGUSSON, 1848-1915: NEW MEXICO
SPOKESMAN FOR POLITICAL REFORM
CALVIN A. ROBERTS

DURING THE CLOSING YEARS of the nineteenth century, New Mexico underwent changes that threatened the established, conservative political order. By definition, the established, conservative
political order was synonymous with the New Mexico Republican
party. Led by a group of men known as the Santa Fe Ring and
bolstered by the support of much of the Hispanic majority, Old
Guard Republicans virtually controlled territorial politics. Facilitating their control was the fact that the Republican party also
dominated the national political scene, directed Congress and won
all but two presidential elections in the years from 1860 to 1912.
New Mexico's Old Guard Republicans could and did seek the power,
prestige, and profit resulting from their domination of territorial
affairs and an endless stream of patronage from Washington, D.
C. l They could and did point with satisfaction to the national party's
call for tariff protection of wool and for irrigation development.
After all, such issues and projects were compatible with the perceived interests and needs of the territory. 2
Then in the 1890s forces for change began to challenge this
existing order. The arrival of railroads and increased immigration
from other parts of the United States broadened New Mexico's
perspective and brought the territory more closely in touch with
national issues and political trends. Farmers from the hotbeds of
agrarian protest, the South and Midwest, were moving into southern and eastern New Mexico in ever increasing numbers. The New
Mexico mining industry, too, became closely attuned to the fortunes
of gold and silver in the national debate over currency. The protests
and demands of the growing number of agrarians and silver en-
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thusiasts shook the existing political order and even led to the
formation· of a Populist party in New Mexico.
Wherever protest was strong, the demands of the farmers and
miners became issues of concern to the major political parties. In
New Mexico the Democratic party picked up the standard by endorsing the cause of free silver in 1890. 3 The clash between these
forces for change and Old Guard New Mexico Republicanism became intertwined with two important issues-the question of statehood for New Mexico and the question of whether New Mexico
would join the growing demands for change in the 1890s and during
the Progressive Era in the first decade and a half of the twentieth
century or whether it would remain under the domination of local,
conservative political forces.
One New Mexican who rose to political prominence in this turnof-the-century clash between the new and the old was Harvey
Butler Fergusson, Sr. Often associated only with Erna Fergusson,
his daughter and noted New Mexico writer, or confused with Harvey
Fergusson, the author and his son, Harvey Butler Fergusson, Sr.
(known to friends as H. B. Fergusson) had a considerable impact
on politics in New Mexico. As a leader of New Mexico's Democratic
party and as a crusading progressive politician, Fergusson challenged the power of Old Guard Republicans and represented in
New Mexico the forces for change. Although his success within the
Democratic party and as a New Mexico politician was varied, his
dedication to progressive ideals was unwavering, for he was, as one
historian has noted, "one of the purest, most ideologically committed progressives in the state's history."4
Born in Pickens County, Alabama, on 9 September 1848, H. B.
Fergusson grew up in the cotton South and lived through the
horrors of the Civil War and the tribulations of Reconstruction. He
chose a career in law, a choice that preordained his future. In the
South membership in the legal profession automatically thrust one
into the public eye and toward politics. But it was the law rather
than politics that brought Fergusson to New Mexico in 1882. As a
member of the Wheeling, West Virginia, law firm ofJacob, Cracraft,
and Fergusson, he traveled to New Mexico to represent the firm's
clients in a dispute over ownership of the North Homestake Mining
Company located near White Oaks, New Mexico. 5
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Arguing his case before the territorial bench, Fergusson lost at
the district court level but won the case on an appeal to the territorial supreme court. In so winning, he scored a victory over
Thomas B. Catron, William T. Thornton, and Frank W. Clancy,
the most successful and formidable law firm in the territory.6 Catron, a Republican, was a powerful leader of the Santa Fe Ring and
later served as one of New Mexico's first two United States senators.
Thornton, a Democrat with close ties to the Santa Fe Ring, later
received President Grover Cleveland's appointment as territorial
governor. A Republican, Clancy subsequently served as the first
attorney general of the state of New Mexico. Soon after his arrival
in New Mexico, then, Fergusson had competed with three of New
Mexico's leading politicians. This connection between law and politics remained typical of his life in New Mexico.
Fergusson's decision to stay in New Mexico rested on his conviction that the burgeoning territory offered opportunities to good
lawyers. His decision must have rested as well on his perception
of a future for himself in New Mexico politics. He remained in
White Oaks for two years, practicing law with John Y. Hewitt, a
successful older attorney and Democratic politician. While in White
Oaks, Fergusson began a lasting interest in mining and assay, acquiring part ownership in the famous Old Abe Mine. Profits from
this mine provided welcome income for years thereafter. Fergussbn
also shared a small cabin with two men who were to make their
impact on New Mexico history. One was William C. McDonald, a
Democrat and later the first governor after statehood. The other
was Emerson Hough, lawyer and noted author of the Southwest.
When Fergusson moved his practice to Albuquerque in 1884, he
left behind staunch friends, a reputation for honesty, and important
political connections. 7
In Albuquerque, Fergusson made his first forays into territorial
politics. As his son later wrote, he entered the arena as "a Democrat-an incorrigible, unreconstructed Southern Democrat." Given
the power of New Mexico's Old Guard Republicans, Fergusson was
from the start a minority political figure. One of his early political
colleagues, L. S. Trimble, once told an amusing if exaggerated
story about the influence and membership of the Democratic party
in Albuquerque. According to Trimble, the tiny party had but three

H. B. Fergusson, courtesy of Francis Fergusson.
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members-Trimble, Fergusson, and a man called Jones. They staged
a party rally that a local newspaper reported as large, noisy, and
enthusiastic. In commenting upon this story, Trimble noted that
he was "large, Jones was noisy, and Fergusson was enthusiastic."
This anecdote illustrates to some extent the lack of a constituency
that Fergusson could call his own, a lack resulting not only from
his choice of party but also from his unwillingness to adopt the
language and customs of the majority Spanish-speaking population
of New Mexico. 8
The election of Democrat Grover Cleveland as president of the
United States in 1884 signalled a transfer of federal and territorial
patronage to New Mexico Democrats. Cleveland appointed as governor Edmund G. Ross, a Democrat and a recent immigrant to
the territory. The former Republican senator from Kansas had gained
notoriety when he cast a decisive vote against removing President
Andrew Johnson from office. Ross, in turn, appointed Fergusson
district attorney for the second judicial district. 9 Believing "in neither fear nor favor" and declining to "follow New Mexico's rules as
to who was sacrosanct," Fergusson proved himself capable of handling the prosecutorial duties of a somewhat lawless and troubled
district. 10 He also used the post of district attorney to get his name
before the public. He believed that he would have to build a
reputation and a following if he were to get ahead as lawye/and
politician in a territory dominated by ambitious men and cliq:Ges.
Vigilante activity in Socorro presented Fergusson with such an
opportunity. The vigilantes used every means, including murder,
to achieve their ends in a small but violent range war between
sheepmen al"l:d cattlemen. The district attorney secured murder
indictments against the vigilante leaders and prosecuted the case
on their home ground in Socorro. Although rumors abounded that
Fergusson would be assassinated if he pressed the case, the territorial prosecutor pursued the convictions with resolution. As might
be expected, the local jury acquitted the defendants. Yet, this action
did not prevent an attempt on Fergusson's life. As he boarded the
train to return to Albuquerque following the trial, a bullet fired by
an unknown assailant shattered the window by his seat. Fergusson,
however, was unhurt, and he had achieved one of his goals-a
reputation for uncompromising honesty and courage. 11
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In 1887 Fergusson stepped down as district attorney and returned to private practice, but he did not retire from active participation in Democratic party politics. He was joined in his partisan
efforts by such rising young men as Albert B. Fall and George
Curry, both of whom would later switch to the Republican party.
Fergusson honed his talents as an eloquent stump speaker during
electoral campaigns, and he joined his colleagues in supporting the
nominations of deserving Democrats to territorial and national offices. As a loyal party member, he openly attacked the Republicansponsored and ill-fated statehood constitution of 1889. By diligently
paying his political dues, Fergusson earned the respect of party
members. 12
The forces of change that began affecting New Mexico in the
1890s aided the career of H. B. Fergusson. He endeavored to act
as spokesman for small farmers settling in the dry farming regions
of New Mexico. As Fergusson's son noted some years later, "My
father watered it [eastside Democratic tendencies] with his eloquence, cultivated it with passion and care." Yet Fergusson's speeches
touched most often upon the intricacies of national issues, not on
local controversies. Because this was the case, his enemies were
the political and economic enemies of the protesting farmer, whom
he cgmpared to the depressed classes of the French Revolution. 13
As his constituency grew, Fergusson found himself more frequently
mentioned as a potential candidate for elective or appointive office.
At the territorial Democratic convention of 1892, his friends, Albert
B. Fall of Las Cruces and Jack Fleming of Silver City, pushed the
nomination of Fergusson for delegate to Congress. But Fergusson's
supporters were unsuccessful when popular Delegate Antonio Joseph won renomination for his fifth consecutive term. Despite his
defeat for the Democratic nomination, Fergusson willingly toured
the territory in support of Joseph and local Democratic candidates. 14
Electoral victory in 1892 paid double dividends for New Mexico
Democrats. Joseph won his fifth term, and Grover Cleveland, after
losing the White House in 1888, once again won the presidency.
For the second time since the Civil War federal patronage eluded
the dominant Republican party. In an effort to influence the chief
executive's appointments for New Mexico, a large delegation of
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Democrats, including Fergusson, traveled to Washington, D. C.,
for the inauguration of Cleveland in 1893. This group achieved
some success. William T. Thornton became New Mexico's governor,
and Fergusson's friend Fall received appointment as justice of the
territorial supreme court. Fergusson, however, did not receive the
appointment he desired as United States attorney for New Mexico.
Cleveland gave this position to J. B. H. Hemingway of Folsom,
New Mexico,15 a choice that evoked protest among New Mexico
Democrats who claimed Hemingway won his appointment only
because he was "a son-in-law of Senator George of Mississippi. "16
In 1894 Fergusson achieved high party office when he was elected
as New Mexico's representative to the National Democratic Central
Committee, a position he held until 1908. 17 But elective office still
eluded him. He actively sought nomination as territorial delegate
to Congress in 1894 at the party convention in Las Cruces with
opposition from Delegate Joseph and former Delegate Francisco
Manzanares. Fergusson's support came from the Albuquerque delegation and southern delegates such as Fall. The issue was in doubt
only until the opening of the convention, when Manzanares, seeing
his cause as hopeless, withdrew from consideration and threw his
support to Joseph.
With this help Joseph's supporters outmaneuvered Fergusson's
on several procedural votes at the beginning of the convention.
When Fergusson realized this continuing trend against his fortunes,
he sought party accord and unity through compromise. Agreeing
to withdraw his candidacy, he made the nomination ofJoseph unanimous. In exchange, the Joseph forces accepted H. L. Warren of
Albuquerque, Fergusson's law partner, as permanent chairman of
the convention. 18 In the ensuing campaign Joseph faced strong
opposition from Republican Thomas B. Catron, and, despite the
active support of Fergusson and Governor Thornton, Joseph lost
the election by more than 2700 votes. Meanwhile, the Populist
candidate, T. B. Mills, received more than 1800 votes. 19
Joseph's defeat in 1894 cleared the way for Fergusson's nomination for territorial delegate to Congress in 1896. Local and national issues of the day-free coinage of silver and the agrarian
revolt-helped propel Fergusson toward his goal. As an early supporter of William Jennings Bryan, Fergusson became spokesman
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for silverites and agrarians in the territory. In addition, he opposed
Cleveland's stand repealing the Sherman Silver Purchase Act since
this action hurt the mining industry in New Mexico. In so doing,
Fergusson took public issue with Governor Thornton, a Cleveland
patron and nominal head of the party in New Mexico. Despite
opposing some of the policies of the president and governor, Fergusson believed his views would find enough support among farmers and miners to win his nomination as congressional delegate.
The first test of this strategy came on 1 May 1896 in Las Vegas
at a party gathering to select delegates to the national convention
in Chicago. On the agenda were proposals to endorse the national
and territorial administrations, but these normally perfunctory actions provoked a floor fight. Fergusson and Fall fought the endorsements for Cleveland and Thornton because the president and
governor favored repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. Although the forces backing Cleveland won by three votes, the prosilver mood of the gathering was mounting. 20
Enthusiasm among New Mexico's monetary rebels naturally increased when Bryan was nominated as the Democratic standardbearer. Many Bryanites in the territory also helped to select Fergusson
as their candidate for delegate to Congress at the September convention of the Democratic party. Once the Democratic nomination
was secured, Fergusson also tried to gain the delegate nomination
from the pro-silver Populists. In seeking the Populist nomination,
he opposed L. Bradford Prince, a pro-silver Republican, former
territorial governor and supreme court justice, who had recently
lost a contest to replace Catron as Republican delegate nominee.
Although Prince won the Populist nomination for delegate in late
September 1896, he proved to be such a lukewarm campaigner for
the Populists that on 6 October 1896 the party withdrew his nomination and gave it to Fergusson. Democratic victory now seemed
assured because,the reformers were united behind one candidate. 21
Both major candidates, Fergusson and Catron, favored statehood
for New Mexico. Silver was the main controversy of the election,
however, and Fergusson campaigned primarily on that issue. 22 His
stand on the issue was so popular that even the Republican Las
Vegas Daily Optic on 16 October 1896 endorsed Fergusson's candidacy while charging that Catron and the Republicans had fallen
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"into the mire and filth of Hannaism.
. "23 Catron and the Republicans struck back, accusing Fergusson of inflammatory rhetoric, demagoguery, and a lack of concern for law and order. These
charges were of no avail, for Fergusson unseated Catron by a vote
of 18,947 to 17,017. Fergusson forged his victory by winning large
. majorities in the counties of the south and east where miner and
agrarian discontent were strongest. 24 Summarizing the reason for
Fergusson's victory, Catron wrote former political associate Stephen
B. Elkins that "the Americans in the territory simply went wild on
the free silver proposition, believing [William Jennings] Bryan would
be elected. "25
The Democratic victory of 1896 was significant to New Mexico
politics for two reasons. First, forces for change were threatening
the Republican party control of territorial politics; and second,
Fergusson was now at the pinnacle of power' among New Mexico
Democrats. From this moment until his death, his name, more
than any other, would be associated with the stands .and fortunes
of the New Mexico Democratic party. He would remain a supporter
of Bryan, a staunch Democrat, a crusader for reform. The last
nineteen years of his political career were a determined struggle
for liberal principles.
When Fergusson arrived in the nation's capital in 1897 to take
his seat as delegate, he was part of a political minority. President
William McKinley's victory over Bryan nullified any impact Fergusson might have had on patronage in New Mexico. More immediately, he was among the minority in Congress. Despite these
circumstances his term as delegate was remarkably successful. He
proved to be a spokesman for his constituents and their needs as
well as for reformist ideals. Answering the perennial desire by New
Mexicans for a greater voice in their affairs, Fergusson introduced
two statehood bills. Although both died, he secured passage of
legislation designating Santa Fe as the permanent capital of the
territory, thus throttling recurrent, time-wasting movements in the
territorial legislature to relocate the seat of government. 26
His most famous accomplishment was an act that bore his namethe Fergusson Act. This legislation called for setting aside sections
of public land for educational purposes. Ordinarily the federal government made grants of public land to a state upon its entry into
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the union, but New Mexico faced the specter of having little valuablepublic land remaining if statehood were withheld for several
years. Because Fergusson foresaw the day when only arid and
otherwise worthless sections would remain,27 he presented his plan
to the House of Representatives on 26 February 1898. As finally
amended, passed, and signed in June 1898, the law gave the territory title to nearly four and a quarter million acres for educational
purposes and internal improvements. 28
The Fergusson Act elicited bipartisan support when New Mexico
Republicans congratulated Fergusson for his efforts. Fergusson
himself admitted that the key to the bill's success lay with the
Speaker of the House, Thomas B. Reed. "Czar" Reed, swayed by
Fergusson's arguments concerning the law's necessity, shepherded
the bill through the lower chamber of Congress. 29 On only one
issue was Fergusson disappointed. He had hoped that his friend
Fall would be appointed as one of the commissioners to select the
land granted to the territory, but all appointments went to New
Mexico Republicans. 30
Fergusson's stay in Congress was short. In 1898 he retained his
party's nomination for delegate, but the Republicans nominated
the popular, wealthy, and well-educated Pedro Perea to oppose
him. The campaign was a difficult one for Fergusson. Silver disappeared as a dominant issue, replaced by popular enthusiasm for
the war with Spain, an issue benefiting the Republicans. Further,
Fergusson fell victim to an ethnic issue. 31 On 14 October 1898 he
complained to a territorial Republican leader that
some in favor of Mr. Perea's election have already shown a disposition to appeal to race prejudice to defeat me. I consider this deplorable both as a matter of general policy and also unfortunate for
me inasmuch, as the native vote largely outnumbers the American
in New Mexico. It surely is not to my interest to have the citizens
of New Mexico divide on race lines in this campaign. 32

In answering this charge, Republicans accused Fergusson of intentionally seeking the support of non-native voters. Whatever the
truth of the opposing allegations, Fergusson lost by nearly HOD
votes. Although he had retained his support in the normally Democratic counties, Hispanic counties went overwhelmingly for Perea. 33
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The election .of 1898 reestablished the unquestioned political
dominance of New Mexico's Old Guard Republicans. Reform politics and the undoing of Republican party control would have to
await further changes in the political climate in the nation and the
territory. As for Fergusson, he returned home in 1899 and resumed
the practice oflaw. Even so, his law practice was never far removed
from the political arena. This was especially true of his involvement
in one of New Mexico's most famous trials, the trial of Jim Gilliland
and Oliver Lee-Democratic cronies of Albert B. Fall-for the
murder of Albert Jennings Fountain, prominent Dona Ana Republican, and his son Henry. Although the Fountains had disappeared in 1896 and the alleged victims' bodies had never been
found, circumstantial evidence implicated Lee, Gilliland, and Billy
McNew.
The eighteen-day trial began on 25 May 1899 and was fraught
with political overtones. The prosecution team consisted of Republican District Attorney Richmond P. Barnes and Thomas B.
Catron, who had been appointed special prosecutor for the territory. Assisting them was William B. Childers, who represented the
Masonic Order of which Fountain had been a member. Fergusson
joined Democrats Fall and Harry M. Daugherty for the defense.
The political overtones of the trial complicated the nature of the
indictments against Lee, Gilliland, and McNew. On one occasion
Fall charged heatedly that some prominent New Mexicans were
determined to convict his clients regardless of the facts of the case.
The defense prevailed, however, when the bodies of Fountain and
his son were never found, and there was no conclusive proof of
their murder. Almost fifty years later, Erna Fergusson was to sum
up H. B. Fergusson's conduct during the trial: "Father was associated with Albert Bacon Fall in the defense, and acquitted himself
, in such a way that nobody ever forgot it. "34
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the political
fortunes of Fergusson and the Democratic party declined in New
Mexico. Old friends such as Curry and Fall deserted to the Republican party, and the Republicans preempted the statehood issue. Still, Fergusson held on, and he made another bid for delegate
to Congress. His opponent was Delegate Bernard Rodey, known
as "Statehood" Rodey for his efforts supporting New Mexico's entry
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into the union. Rodey defeated Fergusson by almost 9700 votes,
the largest margin of defeat for a major party candidate in a New
Mexico delegate election. 35 During the campaign Fergusson's charges
of corruption within the Republican territorial administration could
not override the enthusiasm for statehood, and the Republican
press charged that Fergusson no longer supported the movement. 36
While Fergusson remained a leader of his party as national committeeman until 1908, other men began to seek positions within
the party hierarchy. In 1908 A. A. Jones of Las Vegas, the chairman
of the central committee of the territorial Democratic party, forced
Fergusson to give up the national post. Jones solicited support from
party members throughout the territory with a letter-writing campaign about a month before the party was to convene in Roswell
to choose a new committeeman on 10 June 1908. He discovered
a great number of delegates receptive to his challenge to Fergusson
because they thought it was time for a change. 37 Faced with this
challenge, Fergusson confided to one party member that if "there
was a respectable minority in the convention that thought he should
step out he would do so very cheerfully. "38 And, finding such to be
the case, Fergusson withdrew from the contest and placed Jones's
name in nomination, thus making unanimous his selection to the
National Committee. 39
In 1910 the issue of statehood brought Fergusson back upon the
public stage. In that year, New Mexico held its constitutional convention preparatory for statehood. Hoping to influence the nature
of the document to be drafted, Fergusson sought election of as
many Democratic delegates as possible, including himself. 40 He
hoped that New Mexico would draft a thoroughly progressive constitution, including provisions for initiative, direct primaries, and
the direct election of United States senators. 41 Had New Mexico
entered the union under a progressive constitution it would have
been in step with the six other western territories achieving statehood in the period from 1889 to 1912. But the entrenched, dominant Republican Old Guard dominated the election for convention
delegates and ultimately wrote New Mexico's constitution. Although victors in the 6 September 1910 election included Fergusson, twenty-seven other Democrats, and one Socialist, they were
outnumbered by seventy-one Republicans. 42
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Fergusson assumed leadership of the Democratic contingent and
became the most forceful spokesman for progressive principles at
the October convention in Santa Fe. His speeches were superb.
In urging adoption of provisions for direct democracy on 26 October, Fergusson delivered an hour and fifteen miimte speech before a packed gallery. For Delegate Thomas Mabry, later supreme
court justice and governor of the state of New Mexico, the most
moving moment in the speech came when Fergusson declared that
from the cankerous womb of governmental neglect are born, to
contest for supremacy in this government founded for all free men,
two great classes: The very poor and the very rich-the economic
tramps and the millionaires. I dedicate my life, I cast my lot, with
the common man. 43
Despite such impassioned pleas, Fergusson found that conservative Republicans, who had no use for him or progressivism, outvoted him at every turn. The Old Guard constitution was an extremely
conservative one, disallowing direct election of United States senators, women's suffrage, initiatives, referenda, recall elections, and
direct primaries. Among the constitutions prepared by the seven
western states added to the union between 1889 and 1912, only
that of New Mexico provided for the partisan rather than nonpartisan election of judges. While New Mexico's constitution was out
of step with the constitutions of its neighbors, it was in step with
the political temper of the territory. 44
Unbowed by Republican dominance, Fergusson spoke out against
his political opponents and the statehood constitution. Earlier, he
had warned that conservative Republicans would turn New Mexico
into "the common plundering ground ... of the trusts and monopolies'. . .. "45 Now, he led seventeen Democratic "Irreconcilables" into voting against the new constitution on 21 November 1910.
He even refused to sign it. 46 Through this struggle, H. B. Fergusson
reemerged on the political scene.
After the convention, Fergusson fought statehood with the fire
that characterized his earlier partisan battles. His goal was to "defeat this abortion called the constitution which is intended to protect the ring which has mis-governed New Mexico for twenty years.

.
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In addition he wished "to insert in the constitution in
practical, workable form the leading principles of direct legislation
and make the intiative [sic] applicable to the amendment of the
constitution. "48 The people of New Mexico and the national government, however, rejected these pleas and approved statehood
under the nonprogressive constitution of 1910. 49
Fergusson did not view voter indifference to his appeals against
the constitution as a rejection ofhis progressive principles. Instead,
he must have realized that the desire of New Mexicans for statehood
outweighed all other political considerations. Therefore, he carried
his reform crusade into the election of state officials set for 7 November 1911. Fearing the financial and organizational powers of
the Old Guard, he spent great effort raising money for Democratic
coffers. He even made a direct appeal to William Jennings Bryan
for national support against "our local gang. "50 In return for his
efforts, the Democrats rewarded him with one of its two nominations for the United States House of Representatives. The partisan struggle of 1911 was ferocious, but the Democrats were
extremely successful. They won half the offices selected on a statewide basis, including the election of Fergusson to the House of
Representatives.
Republican Curry, who also won a seat in the House, told an
interesting anecdote concerning his early adventures with Fergusson in Washington, D. C. They arrived on 6 January 1912, just in
time to witness President William Howard Taft issue the proclamation granting statehood to New Mexico. Mterwards the two representatives went directly to the House of Representatives and
presented their credentials. Then Fergusson asked Curry to join
him in a visit with Speaker Champ Clark, Fergusson's personal
friend. Upon seeing them, Clark was surprised and stated .that he
understood that New Mexico was apportioned only one representative, not two. Fergusson explained that New Mexico's statehood bill had given her two representatives, but if only one could
be seated, it would have to be Curry since he had received a larger
number ofvotes in the general election. Clark decided to seat thern
both, stating, "Well, Harvey, that puts the shoe on the other foot.
We need you here and if you must have a Republican colleague,
I am glad it is Governor Curry. . . . "51
•••

"47
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Fergusson proved to be a very able representative. Winning
reelection in 1912, he was a spokesman for New Mexico, the West,
the Democratic party, and progressivism for more than three years.
He sought public improvements for New Mexico and urged strict
conservation of the West's natural resources. As a progressive, he
had an enviable record. In the 63rd Congress he voted for such
major legislation as the Underwood-Simmons TariffAct, the Federal
Reserve Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act, and the Rayburn Securities
Act. 52 He also went to great lengths to secure an adequate distribution of patronage for his party colleagues. For example, he spent
more than a year helping E. V. Long, an old associate, seek the
position of postmaster in Las Vegas. Through his influence A. A.
Jones became assistant secretary of the interior when President
Woodrow Wilson took office in 1913. 53
The partisan politics of the Progressive Era provided Fergusson
with material for continued attacks on Republican opponents. Republican charges that Democrat Woodrow Wilson was an insincere
advocate of progressivism provoked a stinging blast from the New
Mexican. Timing his comments to coincide, ironically, with Taft's
acceptance of renomination for the presidency in 1912, Fergusson
rose on the floor of the House to answer Wilson's critics.
They [the Republicans] are in a perplexing dilemma-what to do
to be saved. Follow the bull moose, crazed as he is with the rabies
of reckless ambition, with menacing front and nostrils belching flames,
headed no telling where, or follow the bull elephant who moves not
at all except as he is pulled by the iron hood of the trainer?54

Then switching to a defense of Wilson's progressivism, Fergusson
raised the oft-used specter of the French Revolution, warning the
"special-privilege holders, with your monkey dinners and your poodle-dog receptions ... " that there was indeed "unrest among the
masses of our countrymen. . . . " He warned his colleagues that
the condition of the working man was "so deep and despairing as
to suggest the awful sufferings in France that preceded the French
Revolution .... "55
But partisan politics in 1914 helped oust Fergusson in favor of
Republican Ben C. Hernandez. Despite an appeal by Wilson to
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the voters of New Mexico that Fergusson be returned to his seat,
age and ill health robbed the New Mexico Democrat of his zest
and vigor for campaigning. At the close of his last term in March
1915, Fergusson went to work as personal secretary to his old
friend, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. But the strain
of his new duties proved too great, causing Fergusson to leave the
post after a brief period. Returning to Albuquerque, he suffered a
nervous breakdown, followed on 10 June 1915 by a fatal stroke. 56
Evaluating the career of H. B. Fergusson is not a simple matter,
in part because his own children saw him as a man of principle
who never achieved his goals. Erna Fergusson illustrates this point
in dedicating her Murder and Mystery in New Mexico to "Harvey
Butler Fergusson who believed in law and order, "57 but on another
occasion describing his life as "a series of brilliant failures. "58 His
son echoed this latter evaluation when he wrote, "I cannot discover
anything significant in his [Fergusson's] later years except that he
was bitterly disappointed in them. . . . He suffered political reverses and failed of his darling ambition, which was to be a United
States Senator. "59
But it is less difficult to summarize H. B. Fergusson's significance
in New Mexico history. Here, the man emerges much more clearly.
As a famous lawyer, he became involved in several hotly contested
legal controversies of his era, involved in a way that invariably
enhanced his personal reputation and advanced his political career.
As an extreme partisan when the Democrats were a minority party,
he helped shape his party's role in territorial and early state politics.
His political activity introduced him to some of the best-known
national and New Mexico figures of his time, notably William Jennings Bryan, Thomas B. Catron, and Albert B. Fall. Political activity
also afforded him the opportunity to display his considerable oratorical eloquence. As a reformer, he proved to be the best-known,
most enduring early spokesman for political change in New Mexico
as the territory emerged from isolation and became more closely
attuned to national problems, trends, and issues. As a public servant, perhaps his most important role, he secured the passage of
the Fergusson Act, which helped prepare New Mexico for statehood
by apportioning public lands for upgrading education. In these ways
H. B. Fergusson left a lasting imprint upon his adopted home.
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NEWS NOTES
In recent years the Review has received much-needed support and aid
from members of its Board of Editors and Consulting Editors. These
persons serve as referees of manuscripts, suggest readers for submissions,
and give guidance for journal policy. The editor is indebted to Paige W.
Christiansen and Dale F. Giese, who are retiring from the Editorial Board,
and to Gilberto Espinosa and Y. A. Paloheimo, who are finishing stints
as Editorial Consultants. Their replacements are John Kessell and Marc
Simmons as editors and Janet Lecompte and Ralph Vigil as consultants.

Communique is the newsletter for the Association for Preservation Technology. A one-year subscription is $8.00. Address orders to the Editor:
Barbara Daniels, P. O. Box 2165, Albuquerque, 87131. Inquiries about
membership should be directed to Ann A. Falkner, Box 2487, Station D,
Ottawa, Ontario, KIP 5W6, Canada.
The UNM anthropology student society will now publish an annual
journal, Haliksa'I: UNM Contributions to Anthropology. Donations of
more than $15.00 to the society entitles the donor to the yearly issue of
Haliksa'I. All contributions are tax deductible. For additional information,
contact Haliksa'I, Department ofAnthropology, UNM, Albuquerque, 87131.
The New Mexico Genealogical Society and the NMHR will sponsor a
conference, "Genealogy in the South," 6 November 1982 from 9 a.m. to
5 p.m. in the Kiva auditorium at UNM. The program is designed to
introduce participants to resources and services for genealogical research
in the southern United States. Speakers will be Winston DeVille and
Richard S. Lackey, who are teachers, writers and researchers. For those
who register before 15 October, the fee is $12.50 ($8.00 for students).
After 15 October, the fee is $15.00 with no student discount. Contact
Linda Mitchell, 1811 Arizona N. E., Albuquerque, 87110 for further information.

THE CARRIZALARCHIVES:

A SOURCE FOR THE MEXICAN PERIOD*
DANIEL TYLER

LOCATED IN THE Casa de Gobierno, Ciudad Chihuahua, awaiting
a permanent home, are the municipal records of Carrizal, a small
community just off the Camino Real between Chihuahua and Ciudad Juarez. As with other collections of Mexican documents, these
records were in deplorable condition when they were accidentally
discovered in the late 1960s by a Texan who had come to Carrizal
to look for an old hacienda door. Noticing bundles of papers in a
roofless adobe building, he pointed out to local authorities the
importance of these official documents and then returned home. l
Shortly thereafter, this same Texan was visited by a Mexican
interested in selling a sack full of documents. He was directed to
the University of Texas at EI Paso (UTEP). After identifying the
material as the Carrizal municipal archives, the university agreed
to make the purchase, encouraged by the seller's threat that he
would destroy the documents if a sale could not be consumated.
A second sack was purchased, and a third was offered, but as
university officials recognized the dangers of purchasing Mexico's
national patrimony, they discouraged additional sales. Instead, the
university began looking for ways to return the documents to Mex-

ico.
Mexican authorities were appreciative of this gesture. The Carrizal municipal archives were returned to the governor of Chihuahua cleaned, organized, and readied for archival storage. While
UTEP officials were in possession of the documents, students worked
to arrange them in approximate chronological order, and the university made a microfilm copy. That film, twenty-three reels, constitutes the Carrizal Archive now available for use through interlibrary
0028-6206/82/0700-0257 $1.10/0
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loan from the UTEP library, Department of Special Collections.
Until the originals can be checked against the UTEP film, it is
impossible to say whether the microfilm copy represents all of
Carrizal's municipal records. The fate of the third sack of unpurchased documents remains unknown. But for the subject covered
in this essay, the Mexican period, an abundance of documentation
is already available, making this collection significant for research
on a variety of frontier-related topics. Used in conjunction with
civil and parochial records from other municipalities, the Carrizal
records constitute an important source for Borderlands history in
the post-colonial period. 2
As Pedro Rivera noted in 1727, a few inhabitants lived in the
area between Ciudad Chihuahua and EI Paso, because the Indians
in the area were not subdued. 3 A few hardy souls, however, had
established haciendas at Carrizal and Ojo Caliente. The Hacienda
de San Fernando de Carrizal was located near the ford of the Rio
Carmen one hundred miles south of EI Paso and ten miles north
of Ojo Caliente. 4 Although it was abandoned due to Apache depredations, the hacienda was "resettled in 1758 as a garrison town"
and renamed the Presidio Militar de San Fernando de las Amarillas
del Carrizal. 5
During the remainder of the Spanish period, Carrizal played an
important part in the Indian wars as a base of operations for Col.
Hugo de O'Conor and as a principal stopping place on the Camino
Real. 6 In the 1760s, Carrizal was even considered "the southernmost outpost of the jurisdiction of New Mexico."7 Although in 1766
its "corporal and ten ragged soldiers ... offered little protection
to the wagon trains, or even to the 161 inhabitants of the hacienda,"
Carrizal became increasingly significant as one of the links in the
chain of presidios recommended by the Marques de Rubi and
implemented by the Reglamento of 1772. This royal order, to be
put into effect by Colonel O'Conor, commanded the presidial company of EI Paso "to relocate at Carrizal on a spacious and level site
which upon inspection proves to be very abundant in water and
pasture."8 The place O'Conor chose was "on the east bank of the
little spring-fed Carrizal River on the south edge of the almost
abandoned town of Carrizal. . . . "9 By 1775, Carrizal had become
part of the new cordon of presidios with a complement of fiftyseven officers and men and eleven scouts. 10
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Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Apache pressures
decreased. Settling many of them on reservations with the necessities of life had calmed the Mimbrefios, while military pursuit
of other tribes reduced the number of violent attacks on defenseless
civilians. 11 With the coming of independence, however, the Indians
returned to the familiar pattern of robbery and pillage. Retaliation
was nearly impossible owing to the shortage of armaments and the
lack of direction from a new government trying to establish itself
as a republic. Located in the middle ofApacheria, Carrizal suffered
from these increased raids.
A law of 5 January 1826 divided Chihuahua into eleven partidos,
each with a cabecera. Carrizal came under the political and military
jurisdiction of Galeana (Presidio de San Buenaventura prior to
1832). Despite the new organization, Apache hostilities during the
1830s were so unrestricted that a group of citizens in Galeana
proposed to overthrow the government,12 and Carrizal was swept
up in the conflict. State efforts to make peace with, the marauders
in August 1832 produced a truce that lasted only a few months. 13
In addition to the need to defend themselves with very little
government aid, Carrizal citizens faced forced contributions to finance new military campaigns. A change in political philosophy
(centralism) divided the state into three districts, causing further
confusion among those responsible for defense. As if these problems
were not enough, Carrizal also experienced the effects of Manifest
Destiny.
First came Lt. Zebulon Pike. He arrived at Carrizal ("Carracal")
on 27 March 1807. Here, for the first time, he saw that "the gazettes
of Mexico" were suggesting that he and his men were involved in
a conspiracy with Aaron Burr to attach part of northern Mexico to
the United States. 14 Pike was followed fourteen years later by merchants from St. Louis passing through Carrizal in search of better
markets farther south. One of them, Josiah Gregg, left a record of
the North American view of Carrizal in the 1830s. 15 Then came the
captives from the Texan-Santa Fe Expedition in 1841; Col. Alexander W. Doniphan's troops followed in 1846 on their way to victory
over the Mexicans at the Sacramento River; and finally, the soldiers
of Col. Sterling Price arrived in 1848 with instructions "to reconnoitre the country [around Carrizal], cut off all communications
. . . and make every effort to obtain information respecting the
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designs and movements of the enemy. "16 Although Mexican officials
informed Colonel Price that the Treaty of Guadalupe H~dalgo had
already been signed, he pressured Mexican forces until shooting
broke out at nearby Rosales. 17 With some justification, therefore,
Carrizalefios of the Mexican period harbored distasteful memories
of their contacts with North Americans. In the twentieth century,
their hostility would burst forth with a vengeance. 18
Histories have all but ignored Carrizal even though it has been
witness to significant borderlands events. Perhaps its past warrants
a more thorough investigation. If so, the microfilm edition of the
Carrizal Archives will prove useful for the Mexican period. Before
using the microfilm edition, however, scholars should recognize
certain limitations:
1. These records are official communications. Most reflect matters of concern involving the juez de paz (formerly alcalde
constituciona~ of Carrizal and the subprefecto (formerly gefe
politico) of Galeana. Trial records, military reports, and state
and national circulars make up the balance.
2. Substantial gaps in the correspondence suggest the loss of
many documents. However, given the propensity of Spanish and Mexican authorities to make multiple copies, missing materials may exist among the originals in Ciudad
Chihuahua or in other municipalities. Galeana and EI Paso
would be the most obvious repositories.
3. Documents in the microfilm edition are, for the most part,
clearly photographed and reasonably well organized. However, documents of 1835 and 1839 are badly mixed, apparently due to the difficulty experienced by the arrangers
in distinguishing between the numerals "5" and "9." Some
documents are incorrectly arranged by copy date, while
others, especially those of February 1842, were filmed out
of order and are chronologically out of sequence on Reel
5. Although the Mexican period supposedly ends with Reel
6, official documents for these years can also be found in
the last four reels.
4. Large gaps in certain years, particularly 1848, suggest that
entire legajos are missing. This and the absence of individual frame numbers make citation of these records most
difficult.
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All in all, the Carrizal materials constitute only a partial record
of life in Apacheria. To search for the remaining historical pieces,
one must understand how documents passed through official channels and how the local political system functioned.
Chihuahua was divided into eleven partidos early in the Mexican
period. 19 Carrizal was the center of one of these partidos until it
became a municipalidad under the control of Galeana (formerly
Valle de San Buenaventura), One of the cabeceras de partido. Incoming correspondence from state and federal authorities passed
first through Ciudad Chihuahua before arriving at Carrizal by way
of Galeana. Outgoing mail was directed through Galeana by the
alcalde constitucional. Within Carrizal, communications were exchanged between the alcalde constitucional and the Compania
Permanente de Carrizal. These were regular troops, referred to as
the presidial company as late as 1846. A few letters were also
exchanged between the alcalde constitucional and the junta municipal.
By the federal constitution of 30 December 1836, the state of
Chihuahua was converted into a department, and its partidos were
abandoned in favor of a three-district system. 20 As part of a nationwide centralization policy, the chain of command in Chihuahua
changed slightly, orienting Carrizal toward the prefecto of the district ofEl Paso. Communications from state and national authorities
now passed through El Paso and Galeana (a subprefectura) on their
way to Carrizal. The change seems to have reflected Carrizal's
preoccupation with Apaches and North Americans. State officials
in Ciudad Chihuahua expressed frustration over the long delays in
getting a response to their orders, which suggests that the new
structure of government was possibly less efficient and less centralized than before. At the local level, however, very little changed.
Carrizal documents contain some useful socio-political sources.
The role of the alcalde constitucional dominates in most matters
of concern to the local citizenry. He made decisions concerning
water management, tax collecting, census taking, approval of guias
for traveling merchants, and raising militia forces. He sat with, and
exerted great influence on, the junta municipal; he maintained law
and order by naming a juez de policia; and he served as a court
of first resort for citizens with grievances. He was elected by the
sala capitular, a specially formed committee of the junta municipal,
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after his nomination had been made and approved by superiors in
the state chain of command. 21 An acta of the junta municipal informed the public of his election and also named his assistant (suplente).
The Carrizal documents also provide numerous population surveys. For political reasons, the census was important. It determined
how many electors should be sent to Galeana to vote for congressmen, senators, governor, and representatives in Mexico City. Laws
made clear who was eligible to vote, and by means of the padrones
generales (general census) a record was kept of every individual,
his age, occupation, marital status, and literacy. Lists of citizens
were used to record votes since secret balloting was unheard of.
The formality of convening ajunta de elecciones primarias, for the
simple purpose of electing an elector, reveals the seriousness with
which Carrizaleiios took their political responsibilities.
Military matters were of even greater importance, and in these
records the diligent researcher will find many treasures. Of particular interest are the service records of soldiers (filiaciones), which
provide a physical description, age, and occupation of each individual. As war with the Apaches escalated after 1831, the state of
Chihuahua began to demand more from local militia. Carrizal records reveal how this militia was organized (civica, urbana, rural),
what kind of arms and montura they possessed, and how much the
vecindario contributed to its support.
Comments on the Apaches predominate because of their repeated incursions into the area. Occasionally, distinctions are made
between Mimbreiios, Gileiios, }icarillas, and Mescaleros, but the
most typical reference is to "barbaros" or "indios gentiles." Apaches
de Paz are also mentioned in reference to some groups settled on
reservations near Carrizal. 21 Mention of the Comanches and Kiowas
is infrequent, suggesting that these tribes were far less menacing
to Mexicans living along the Camino Real.
Official communications frequently allude to the role of North
Americans in the Indian wars. Letters detail who is selling arms
to the Apaches and the means to be employed for arresting these
individuals. Official concern is not limited to foreigners. Correspondence involving the governor's office in 1834 makes clear that
some Mexicans were taking advantage of the unsettled situation
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around Carrizal by sounding false alarms and robbing their own
people when the militia and regular troops sallied forth to engage
the enemy.23 Mter hearing reports that fifty Mexican soldiers had
been chased off by five barbaros at Namiquipa in 1847, state officials of Chihuahua expressed genuine concern about the valor and
patriotism of their people who now faced the additional challenge
of a North American invasion. 24
Lamentably, the municipal records for the years of the MexicanAmerican w~r are either badly damaged (August-September 1846),
very skimpy, or missing entirely (December 1846-July 1847). A
few scattered references to the battle at Rosales in 1848 constitute
the major part of information relevant to the war.
Those interested in social history, however, will find a respectable quantity of useful material. Regular reports on the school in
Carrizal mention the number of students in attendance, their levels
of reading and writing, the teacher, his irregular salary, and the
ever-present problem of inadequate supplies. An interesting state
program, which may have involved young people in Carrizal, was
aimed at sending twelve children to study in the United States in
1828. Quarterly reports on births, marriages, and deaths reflect
population growth, while requests from the state of Chihuahua
regarding disease control indicate the extent to which Carrizal
suffered from measles and smallpox epidemics. Marital problems
and squabbles between neighbors surface in the sumarias (verbal
proceedings prior to a formal trial), while the property holdings of
citizens, especially those who died intestate, appear in several
inventarios.
One can also find some data on local farming and commerce.
Agricultural products (corn, wheat, beans, chile, and peas) are
described in detail along with prices an,d systems of weights and
measures. Efectos del pais (locally grown or manufactured products) are often mentioned because of their exemption from certain
taxes, while merchandise comerciantes traded on the Camino Real
appears in several lists. Municipal reports include taxes collected
on alcoholic beverages, the number of animals slaughtered, and
licenses issued to peddlers (revendedores) and others reponsible
for organizing public amusements.
In sum, the Carrizal documents may raise more questions than .
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they answer, but combined with the records of other partidos in
Chihuahua and New Mexico, they should contribute significantly
to a better understanding of a period that has not received sufficient
attention from historians. The municipal records ofCiudad Juarez,
Ciudad Chihuahua, and Durango form an additional part of the
excellent Borderlands microfilm collection at UTEP. Every diligent
researcher should learn a lesson from the serendipitous discovery
of the Carrizal Archives. Each of us should be on the lookout for
other pieces of the documentary puzzle that, like the records of
Carrizal, might be weathering away in another roofless structure
in northern Mexico.
Reel Number

1.

2.
3.

4.*

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17. **
18. ***
19.
20. ****
21. *****
22.
23. ******

Dates

26 January 1827-9 February 1828
11 February 1828-28 October 1830
28 October 1830-29 September 1834
3 September 1834-26 April 1842
1 January 1841-21 July 1847
8 July 1847-27 July 1853
5 August 1853-16 February 1861
12 February 1861-30 April 1864
15 April 1864--6 October 1867
25 October 1867-14 November 1870
16 December 1870-12 March 1874
16 March 1874-7 February 1878
7 February 1878-4 November 1880
22 October 1880-8 September 1883
8 September 1883-17 December 1886
20 December 1886-30 September 1888
25 September 1888-1 May 1893
12 June 1893-28 January 1902
16 January 1902-31 May 1913
31 May 1913-31 July 1934
29 November 1869-miscellaneous
16 May 1822-2 July 1840
30 June 1840-26 July 1913

'In reel 4, February 1842 was photographed before January 1841.
January 1841, therefore, appears on reel 5.
"The last document is actually dated 23 May 1853. Because of numeral
confusion, this reel contains a great deal from the 1850s.
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***Many documents from the 1850s.
****Many undated documents. Others at the end of the reel cover a
pe~iod from 1830 to 1935.
*****No particular order to these documents, which date from the
1830s on.
******This reel has a large quantity of material on the 1840-48 period.

NOTES
*Research on this article was supported in part by a grant from the National
Endowment for the Humanities and the Museum of New Mexico.
1. Several people have contributed to the author's information on the Carrizal
Archives. Mr. Simeon (Bud) Newman, assistant archivist at the University ofTexas
Library, El Paso, provided some of the details regarding UTEP's acquisition of
the documents. Lic. Manuel Russek, secretario general de gobierno del estado
de Chihuahua in 1980, opened his private library and put the author in contact
with Sr. Antonio Martinez who controls the forty "cajas de folletos" in which the
Carrizal originals presently exist.
2. In 1976, the Archivo General de la Naci6n created a special department
for the purpose of identifying and preserving the oldest documents in state archives. This Departamento del Registro Nacional de Archivos has begun work in
all states of the republic except Morelos, Tamaulipas, Chiapas, and Sonora. The
scope of this project is so vast that the goal for the present sexenio (ending in
1982) is to survey only 20 percent of the civil and parochial archives in 3,020
municipalities. The budget includes funds for publications, one of which, "Inventory of Chihuahua," is scheduled to appear before the end of 1982. For further
information, write to the Departamento del Registro Nacional de Archivos at the
present address of the AGN: Tacuba 8, Mexico 1, D. F. Telephone: 512-99-08.
3. Pedro Rivera to Casa Fuerte, Presidio del Paso del Rio del Norte, 26
September 1727, as quoted in After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of
New Mexico, 1696-1727, ed. Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), p. 214.
4. Max L. Moorhead, New Mexico's Royal Road: Trade and Travel on the
Chihuahua Trail (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), p. 44.
5. Moorhead, Royal Road, p. 16. See also Francisco R. Almada, Resumen de
historia del estado de Chihuahua (Mexico: "Libros Mexicanos," 1955), p. 112.
6. Almada, Resumen, p. 124.
7. Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico [UNMl Press, 1968), p. 4.
8. "Reglamento e Instrucci6h, Para los Presidios que se han de Formar en la
Linea de Frontera de la Nueva Espana," in Sidney B. Brinckerhoff and Odie B.
Faulk, Lancers for the King (Phoenix: Arizona Historical Foundation, 1965), pp.

53-54.
9. Rex E. Gerald, Spanish Presidios ofthe Late Eighteenth Century in Northern
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New Spain, Museum of New Mexico Research Records, no. 7 (Santa Fe: Museum
of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 25.
10. Max L. Moorhead, The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), p. 73.
11. As of 1773, 2000 Apaches were settled on eight reservations. By 1796, the
Mimbreiios were divided into two groups, one of which was reduced to half its
size by the effects of Spanish arms; the other half settled on reservations at Janos
and Carrizal. For more information see Moorhead, Presidio, p. 261, and Moorhead, The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769-1791 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p.
285.
12. This is the Plan Politico of 1836 proclaimed by a group of citizens in the
municipio de Buenaventura. See Almada, Resumen, p. 207.
13. Almada, Resumen, pp. 196--97.
14. Elliott Coues, ed., The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike, 3 vols.
(New York: Francis P. Harper, 1895), 2: 650-52.
15. Josiah Gregg reported that Carrizal was a "small village with only three or
four hundred inhabitants, but somewhat remarkable as being the site of a presidio
[fort] at which is stationed a company of troops to protect the country against the
ravages of the Apaches, who, notwithstanding, continue to lay waste the ranchos
in the vicinity and to depredate at will within the very site of the fort." See Gregg,
The Commerce of the Prairies, ed. Milo M. Quaife (New York: The Citadel Press,
1968), pp. 246--47.
16. U.S., Congress, Ex. Doc. 1, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 1847, p. 113, as quoted
in Marching With the Army of the West, 1846-1848, ed. Ralph P. Bieber, The
Southwest Historical Series, vol. 4 (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1936),
pp. 353, 213n.
17. Almada, Resumen, pp. 228-29.
18. Reference is made to the killing of twelve Americans who entered Carrizal
as part of the invasion force of Gen. John J. Pershing. The date of the encounter,
21 June 1916, became a Chihuahuan holiday. See Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood
on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London:
Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 95, 303-10; see also Florence C. Lister and
Robert H. Lister, Chihuahua, Storehouse of Storms (Albuquerque: UNM Press,
1966), p. 262.
19. Before 1837, the partido de Galeana was the cabecera for Valle de San
Buenaventura, Janos, Namiquipa, and Carrizal. After 1837, Galeana's responsibilities also included Casas Grandes, Escondido, San Miguel, Cruces, Cienega,
and Carmen. See the two printed circulars from the state legislature of Chihuahua
dated 24 March 1832, Carrizal Archives, reel 3, and 28 June 1837, Carrizal Archives, reel 4.
20. Francisco Almada notes the following regarding the organization of the
three districts:
1. Chihuahua, with dependent partidos of Aldama, Cusihuiriachi, Guerrero, Ocampo, Rosales, Galeana.
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2. Hidalgo de Parral, with dependent subprefecturas ofAllende, Jimenez,
Balleza, Batopilas.
3. Ciudad Juarez, with its dependent partido of Janos (Almada, Resumen,
p. 208). Almada's information is in conflict with the circular of 28 June
1837, Carrizal Archives, reel 4.
21. After 1837, the governor of Chihuahua nominated prefectos, subprefectos,
and jueces de paz (Almada, Resumen, p. 208).
22. The citizenry was not too pleased with this arrangement, believing that
the Indians were continuing to rob at the same time that they enjoyed the benefits
offood and protection. See Juez de Paz de Carrizal to Subprefecto de Galeana,
13 February 1843, Carrizal Archives, reel 5.
23. See correspondence between the Jefatura (Galeana) and the Governor of
Chihuahua, OCtober to December 1834, Carrizal Archives, reel 4.
24. Subprefectura de Galeana to Juez de Paz de Carrizal, 18 October 1847,
citing an angry letter from the Prefecto de Chihuahua, Carrizal Archives, reel 6.

BOOK NOTES
A revised edition of Houston: A History by David G. McComb will be of interest
because of urban growth in the Southwest. First published in 1969, the volume
has been updated (University of Texas Press, cloth, $25.00, paper, $8.95).
Leon C. Metz, former archivist and current assistant to the president of the
University ofTexas at El Paso, has been a frequent contributor to historical writing
in the Southwest, particularly with biographies of gunfighters and lawmen such
as John Selman, Dallas Stoudenmire, and Pat Garrett. His most recent book,
Fort Bliss: An Illustrated History (Mangan Books, 6245 Snowheights Ct., El Paso,
Tex. 79912, cloth, $34.95) is a large, attractive book that makes extensive use of
photographs from the collection of Millard G. McKinney. In sixteen chapters Metz
describes the history of the fort from its origins to the present, including the
White Sands missile range. The photographs are excellent, and the book should
interest those studying military history and the New Mexico-Texas border region.
A related study, Bottles on the Western Frontier, by Rex L. Wilson (University
of Arizona Press, cloth $40.00, paper $19.95), is based on archeological work at
Fort Union, New Mexico, and Fort Laramie, Wyoming. The format is large, and
the book is heavily illustrated with photographs and descriptions of 422 bottles.
Collectors will find this a must.
In 1903, William Hattich, editor of the Tombstone Daily Prospector published
a book on Tombstone focusing on the economic development of the community
and upon its prominent, rather than notorious, men. Tombstone has been reprinted by the University of Oklahoma Press (cloth $9.95) with a brief introduction
by John Gilchriese. It includes numerous photographs.
A little more than twenty years ago the University of Oklahoma Press published
A Fitting Deathfor Billy the Kid by Ramon F. Adams, who had already contributed
Western Words and Six-Guns and Saddle Leather to the literature of the West.
Billy the Kid has just been reprinted by Oklahoma in hardcover ($14.95) and in
paper ($7.95). Adams was interested in separating myths surrounding New Mexico's most famous badman from reality, and effectively analyzed the development
in the literature, dealing with dime novels, magazines, biographies, etc. One
chapter is entitled "The Old-Timer Thinks He Remembers." The book has been
used widely, and the new printing, particularly in paperback, is welcome.
Another extremely valuable publication is Indian-White Relations in the United
States: A Bibliography ofWorks Published 1975-1980 (1982), compiled by Francis
Paul Prucha, leading authority on U.S. Indian policy, and published by the University of Nebraska Press (cloth $14.95, paper $7.95). This update of Prucha's A
Bibliographical Guide to the History of Indian-White Relations in the United
States (University of Chicago Press, 1977) follows the same format as the earlier
work. The headings include sources, gUides to sources, policy, treaties, land,
military relations, missionaries, law, education, health, and Indian groups. It is
an essential volume for libraries, including large public libraries in New Mexico,
and will be of significant value to anyone seriously interested in Indian-white
relations.

MEXICAN IMMIGRATION AND BORDER STRATEGY
DURING THE REVOLUTION, 1910-1920

DOUGLAS W. RICHMOND'

a variety of rivals by 1915, Venustiano Carranza
established a nationalist government that confronted Woodrow Wilson and the United States. Many ofthe resulting conflicts originated
along the U.S.-Mexican border because life in that area became
violent. The uncertain status of Mexican braceros and immigrants
became important issues for both governments, especially when
Carranza decided to remedy the plight of Mexican immigrants and
to' organize them as his allies. Political strategies and the economies
of both countries depended upon successful resolution of these
border disputes.
Mexico's most important political change, the Revolution of 1910
to 1920, naturally dominated these years. Beginning with the efforts
of Ricardo and Enrique Flores Mag6n to organize armed resistance
and working class solidarity against the governments of Porfirio
Diaz and Francisco Madero, anarchosyndicalism became one of
the radical manifestations of a social revolution affecting the border
after 1910. Border issues such as radical dissent were complex
because, though originating within the region, they had noticeable
impacl on Washington, D.C. and Mexico City.
- To deal with these border problems, the Mexican government
requested permission from the United States to send Mexican troops
across the United States side of the border to defeat radicals. Because areas such as Baja California were inaccessible and traditional
regions of filibuster activity and these requests vital to the security
of any regime, the United States usually cooperated because many
of the Mexican anarchosyndicalists had Mexican-American adherents in Los Angeles, Texas, and throughout the Southwest. 1 Both
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governments tried to keep the border free of leftist dissidents who
might aid the growth of the Industrial Workers of the World or the
Magonistas.
Once Woodrow Wilson and Carranza assumed power, however,
national strategies along the border became warlike. Wilson sought
any pretext to remove Huerta, threatening him with armed intervention if he could not control and defeat the "vandalism" caused
by the Villista and Carrancista groups. 2 After the U. S. invasion of
Veracruz in 1914, Huerta tried to unify the nation hehind him and
put aside the differences the civil war had caused. But the Constitutionalist forces of Carranza ignored Huerta's demands that they
battle together against occupation forces at Veracruz. 3 A few months
later, Huerta fled the country and within two years died in exile.
During his career as rebel and constitutional president, Carranza
carefully considered the political complexities of the border. He
established several sympathetic newspapers on both sides of the
border with Constitutionalist propagandizers campaigning effectively in several border towns and collecting large amounts offunds.
In addition, several juntas constitucionalistas recruited men and
found supplies for Carranza during his various struggles. The average border inhabitant, however, suffered greatly when revolutionary forces seized food, horses, and other goods. It was not
always a comfort to know that enemies of Carranza would have
their land taken away. Although the seized lands were returned by
1917, the years of violence meant insecurity and fear. 4
Carranza's desire for a secure border often motivated his diplomacy concerning the U.S.-Mexican boundary. Obtaining de facto
recognition was a major task. Some Mexican generals went to the
extreme of offering to cross the border and to raise the Mexican
flag in order to obtain the desired result. 5 After Wilson relented
and recognized the Carranza government, both governments avoided
war but sought to protect their interests. Agreements for pursuit
of bandits on both sides of the border personified this spirit, and
working class organizations pressured Carranza and Wilson to settle
their differences peacefully.6 In the meantime, Carranza decided
to control his side of the border. Whenever possible, he exiled
priests and other dissidents, and when Mexican authorities turned
over to American officials a Mexican national 'accused of theft, Car-
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ranza had the careless subordinate shot. 7 Incidents involving national honor were paramount to Carranza.
Carranza's diplomatic triumphs established the precedent of a
nationalist foreign policy that enabled future Mexican governments
to protect Mexico's economic and political interests. Carranza was
more bold than any other leader of the Mexican Revolution in
resisting the intervention of the Wilson regime. For this stance,
he received widespread support from all classes when he opposed
U. S. imperialism. 8 Because Wilson and Carranza were determined
to implement their plans, the frontera norte became the scene of
bitter conflicts.
Carranza's most dramatic innovations were his policy of protecting Mexico's natural resources and his imposing state regulations on most economic activity. As early as 1914, Carranza tripled
the oil production tax. He also suspended the construction of new
oil fields in January 1915 and decreed that oil companies must
submit detailed plans to his officials for their approval. 9 In addition
to securing massive revenue from the oil fields, Carranza asserted
Mexican ownership of subsoil wealth in other foreign-owned sectors
of the economy. In September 1916, Carranza ordered foreign and
national mineowners to renew full-time operations or face expropriation. 1o Like the oil companies, mineowners such as the Guggenheims had to pay sharply increased taxes in oro nacional (gold
currency). 11
Carranza also began attacking foreign control of the nation's land.
A decree in June 1916 ruled that foreign capitalists had to renounce
external citizenship, promise formally to abide by Mexican law,
and recognize that the Carranza regime could intervene into any
matter involving foreign-owned lands. Carranza also barred foreigners from buying land in the federal district and various st~tes
throughout the country. In addition, the government revoked many
of the colonization contracts the Diaz regime had granted. Most
of the land concessions involved border areas capitalized by development companies from the western United States. 12
Unfortunately, wartime conditions and the clash between Wilson
and Carranza over the exploitation of Mexico's natural wealth slowed
the revival of the border economy. North American companies
generally opposed the enormous tax increases Carranza imposed.
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To pressure him into retreating, they delayed renewing operation
of their plants. Shortages of coal and oil also endangered the recovery of various industries, particularly in the mining sector. Another debilitating component of border economic problems was
inflation. Until financial stability asserted itself in 1917, the border
suffered from counterfeiters and a flood of new currency. 13
Despite Carranza's new economic policies, northern Mexico continued to depend upon border trade with the United States. This
relationship was not always beneficial, particularly when U. S. officials adversely affected the frontera norte's commercial traffic by
suspending trade across the border. 14 Another persistent border
irritant was the problem of contraband. Anxious to protect her
industry even during the Revolution, Mexico erected tariff walls
to restrict the entry of many U. S. goods, but smuggling satisfied
demands for North American products despite plans to stamp out
illegal border trade. This conflict was particularly difficult for Carranza because he would not permit Mexican agricultural exports
in order to feed a hungry population. Although Carranza was successful in regulating foreign economic activity, U. S. and British
wealth in Mexico increased during the Revolution. 15 Moreover,
massive migration of Mexicans into the United States from 1916 to
1920 illustrates the economic problems that Mexico suffered during
that era.
Mexican emigration to the north had begun even before the
United States was a nation. First, Spanish conquistadors conquered
what is now Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California, but when
Mexico lost possession of Texas in 1836 and the Southwest in 1848,
many Mexicans remained to become U.S. citizens. Some assumed
positions of power and influence, but more were treated as a conquered group by subsequent waves of Anglos from the east and
north. The first real Mexican migrations began with the building
of railroads across the Southwest. The railroads provided transportation and jobs for the new Mexican immigrants, dispersing
them through shanty towns in Arizona and New Mexico, to California farms, and into Texas mines. Soon they became the premier
agricultural workers throughout the Southwest and spread into
factories of the Midwest. By 1900, an estimated 100,000 Mexicans
were living in the United States. 16

RICHMOND: MEXICAN BORDER STRATEGY

273

The first U.S. restrictions upon Mexican immigration evolved
during the early years of the Revolution. Until the creation of the
Border Patrol in 1924, only about sixty mounted agents patrolled
the 1900-mile border. Lax border control enabled the immigrants
to cross the frontera norte with ease until anarchists caused concern. Because Mexican radicals cooperated with the Western Federation of Miners and received aid from militant labor leaders in
the United States, the first U.S. restrictions placed upon Mexican
immigration in 1903 were designed to check the entry of anarchists.
Most of the Mexican anarchists. were young, politically aware immigrants who had a profound impact upon Mexican-American communities. These activists tried to prepare the communities for
revolution in Mexico and organized strikes in a number of areas. 17
While keeping in mind opposition against him in the United
States and socioeconomic changes in Mexico, Carranza carefully
assessed the role of Mexicans along the border. Mexican immigrants
were a major factor in Carranza's policy of curtailing U.S. intervention. The humanitarian impulse of the Mexican Revolution,
whose egalitarianism proclaimed protection of oppressed peoples
from the strong powers, was another major factor. Carranza responded to border Mexicans and their needs as if they lived in
Mexico.
The immigration of Mexican laborers across the border was a
painful episode in Mexican and U.S. history. Carranza had witnessed the traumatic conditions of these generally poor people
when in exile in San Antonio. Bad treatment of the immigrants
angered Carranza early in his career, and he was determined to
improve the situation. 18 As violence increased after 1911, whole
villages fled across the border. As is the case today, the refugees
were looking for work often not available in Mexico. Sleeping on
the streets of Eagle Pass and other border cities, the immigrants
frequently subsisted on little more than coffee and crackers. (Those .
not searching for jobs were usually the families of various factional
groups fighting in Mexico.) Without shoes and dressed in rags,
these refugees elicited sympathy from Mexican as well as North
American officials. 19
Carranza opposed emigration because the flight of Mexican workers disrupted economic recovery when labor became scarce. In
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Fred R. Wulff, U. S. mine owner, with two peons near Torreon. Courtesy of Alice
W. McCart.

Mexican revolutionaries led by Jose Ines Salazar in action near the border.
Courtesy of Alice W. McCart.
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addition to the large numbers who crossed the border, many Mexican workers moved throughout northern Mexico from one area to
another in search of jobs. The attitude of Mexican governors along
the border matched that of the chief executive. Their apprehension
about the loss of agricultural workers convinced Carranza to take
action. 20 In March 1918, he prohibited the issuing of passports to
Mexican workers attempting to find employment across the border. 21
Carranza's nationalist border policy also included attempts to
protect Mexican braceros who found work in the United States.
By January 1917, the Secretaria de Gobernaci6n informed emigration officials that no Mexican laborers could leave the nation
unless they had a contract outlining hours of work and compensation. 22 Carranza also used his consuls to intervene in the making
of contracts so that Mexican workers would have decent conditions
outlined and enforced. When a strike of Mexican workers in Clifton,
Arizona, threatened to explode into violence, Carranza answered
the Arizona governor's appeal for aid; he sent his best consul to
arbitrate differences, and as a result the workers secured wage
increases. 23 Carranza's early concern for their welfare did not go
unnoticed among Mexican immigrants. By 1915, many of them
continued to support Carranza, despite propaganda campaigns by
conservative and Catholic refugees attacking the president. 24
Meanwhile, diplomatic conflict with the Wilson government provoked th~ first comprehensive United States restrictions against
Mexican immigration. The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917
insisted that all aliens be literate and pay an eight dollar head tax.
Wilson, however, overlooked the fact that the World War I created
a new labor demand, which made this legislation meaningless.
Under pressure from growers, Wilson lifted the restriction in May
but imposed a six-month residence period for braceros, forced them
to carry identification cards, and threatened deportation for those
attempting to work in nonagricultural jobs. In addition, state governments were supposed to establish housing and sanitation standards. To discourage the Mexicans from becoming U.S. citizens,
growers withheld the workers' wages at discounted rates of ten to
twenty percent each month. These wages were deposited in the
U. S. Postal Savings Bank until the braceros returned to their place
of departure in Mexico. 25
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For the first time, a Mexican government actively demanded
that workers who migrated to the Southwest be treated fairly. In
doing so, Carranza frustrated the work oflabor recruiters searching
for bracero workers in Mexico. Despite the arguments of U. S.
Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher and the Labor Department, Carranza pointed out that working conditions were unsatisfactory and
that southwestern growers never fulfilled their contracts. Mexico
made it clear that only if the U.S. federal government would cooperate in ending bad labor conditions and heed the complaints of
the braceros could they expect to receive unlimited Mexican labor. 26 But the State Department considered "inexpedient" an agreement with Carranza on uniform regulations and reciprocal border
permits. 27
Still unresolved, these problems continue to plague relations
between both nations. But in the past, the list of complaints was
much longer. The Mexican foreign relations ministry protested the
conscription of Mexican citizens into the U. S. army and their use
as strikebreakers. Then, as now, coyotes promised good employment to Mexican workers but often abandoned them along la &ontera norte. Despite formidable objections from the Carranza
government, its workers continued to toil in humiliating circumstances. 28 Carranza, his governors, and Mexican consuls restricted
immigration to protest poor living conditions and endemic racism
that Mexicans often encountered in their new surroundings along
the border. 29
Carranza also attempted to aid those whose fortunes in the United
States declined. Under the pressure ofliving without their families,
several Mexican immigrants went insane, whereupon North American officials usually jailed and deported them. 30 When high wartime salaries in the U.S. ended, many immigrants did not find the
work that they sought. From 1915 to 1919, hundreds of braceros
returned to Saltillo, Piedras Negras, and Ciudad Juarez. The Carrancistas became concerned about their suffering because many
lacked funds to purchase train tickets to return home. 31 Thousands
of Mexicans stranded along the border and out of work accepted
Carranza's offer of free transportation. Carranza telegraphed each
governor and secured work for braceros in states such as Oaxaca,
Morelos, Campeche, Yucatan, and Michoacan. 32 Carranza also
sent hundreds of dollars for the relief of refugees near Eagle Pass. 33
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Various generals and governors provided unsuccessful immigrants
with land seized from Carranza's wealthy opponents and urged
Carranza to expand this policy. 34
Residents of the United States never welcomed the immigrants
with open arms. From 1918 to 1920, the Wilson government feared
that Carranza would encourage rebellion within the United States,
and many Southwesterners believed that Mexican refugees would
sow revolutionary ideas among minorities and labor organizations.
U.S. border patrols often had orders to stop anyone crossing the
line and frequently shot Mexicans who tried to ford the rivers or
boundaries. The arrival of Mexican army reinforcements in 1918
temporarily halted these flagrant abuses and death-dealing U.S.
raids across the border. 35
Social conditions in various Mexican border cities were strikingly
similar to problems of today. The turbulence of the Revolution
forced cities such as Ciudad Juarez to request funds for public
works projects such as streets and slaughterhouses. 36 Because the
Rio Grande cut off Mexican territory eventually claimed by the
United States, a Chihuahua deputy asked Carranza for 100,000
pesos to reconstruct defensive fortifications in front of Ciudad Juarez.
The dispute over this land, known as the Chamizal problem, would
fester for several decades until the United States returned the land
to Mexico in 1964. 37
Still, morale in the border cities remained higher than many
Carrancista authorities expected. Residents of Piedras Negras appealed to Carranza when their Jefe de Armas opened up a Gran
Jugada as a source of municipal revenue. They argued that this
gathering place resulted in "ruin and shame" because thirsty gringo
visitors showed up to drink excessively in cantinas and encourage
cockfights. 38 Physical security was another problem for border towns.
In some areas, municipal police had to be called on to battle bandits, Villistas, and U.S. soldiers who crossed the border to hunt
down Mexican raiders. During these armed conflicts many Mexican
citizens in border areas lost their lives. 39
In North American cities, Mexican consuls actively protested
numerous abuses that Mexican refugees suffered. Humiliated by
unemployment, discrimination, unofficial segregation, Texas rangers, and vicious lynchings, immigrants on the border and most

Mexican braceros constructing the Trasquila dam in northern Mexico. Courtesy
of Alice W. McCart.
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Mexican-Americans found life very difficult. Living conditions were
uniformly bad. In Laredo and most other Texas towns, Mexicans
and their children experienced segregation in public facilities. 40
Sympathetic to the plight of the immigrants and eager to promote
their interests, Carranza ordered his consuls in border cities to
demand that Mexicans receive fair treatment. For example, officials
such as F. J. Stafka protested films in Tucson that depicted Mexican
soldiers abusing U. S. citizens and their children. Consuls also protested the indifference of U. S. customs officials to the suffering of
refugees in areas such as Douglas, Arizona. 41
This intervention of consuls into the lives of Mexican nationals
was a historical departure from the pre-Revolution days when the
plight of immigrants was not considered a serious matter. These
new actions of Mexican diplomats brought mixed responses. Mexican residents in U.S. border cities often praised or condemned
the efforts of these officials. Some urged armed resistance to the
Wilson government or cited specific abuses needing to be corrected. Not all refugees, however, were poor. Some of them plotted
against the Carranza government with the aid of North American
investors who would have prospered if Carranza's economic reforms
ended. 42
As working class life began to improve, the generally militant
labor movement managed to reach some accommodation with .the
new regime in Mexico City. A principal cause of the Revolution
was the resentment that workers harbored against foreign investors. Before Carranza came to power, mine workers demanded that
the federal government no longer permit foreigners to exploit them. 43
The proletariat emerging from the mines became so militant that
they often threatened to lynch brutal foremen, even after judges
absolved these supervisors of any crimes. 44 Once Carranza became
the executive, Carrancistas listened carefully to working class demands, and state governments along the border negotiated with
strikers before calling in troops to restore order. In Coahuila, the
governor requested more rail traffic from the federal government
to mitigate the effects of local layoffs. 45 Generally speaking, Carranza and his governors preferred a paternalistic relation with labor
in which they attempted to check revolutionary protests with mild
reformism or repression.

280

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

57:3

1982

Despite continued attempts to eradicate them, vice and corruption maintained their sturdy tradition along the border. Some of
Carranza's officials, often intoxicated in various bars or found guilty
of fraud, left something to be desired. Many authorities could not
resist the juicy bribes forthcoming from the increased traffic in
drugs, alcohol, and prostitution in the frontier towns. The vice
trade increased noticeably after prohibition became the law in the
United States, with drugs and crime becoming a way of life. The
governor of Baja California was so corrupt that he operated an
opium business in conjunction with Chinese merchants. He used
his hypodermic needle so often that one leg and one arm were
partially black and covered with ugly perforations. 46
In addition to these problems, border clashes between the Mexican and United States military were as frequent as they were
serious. Earlier, Mexican raids upon Texas ranchers provoked general tension, and the constant incursions of U. S. soldiers also contributed to a growing xenophobia along the frontera norte as Mexican
citizens often fought them with the aid of federal troops. In several
cases, U.S. soldiers fired upon Mexican citizens and soldiers merely
for approaching the linea divisoria. These incidents often resulted
from the illegal passage of contraband supplies to anti-Carranza
rebels. On other occasions, many border residents drew rifle fire
when they tried to avoid paying customs taxes. Carranza was particularly angry when he learned that the head of the Texas Rangers
aided conservative dissidents who attacked Mexico from Texas. 47
Lengthy presidential addresses in 1918 and 1919 indicate that these
animosities left a lasting rancor that still has not entirely disappeared.
The degree of support that Carranza received in opposing the
Pershing expedition of 1916 illustrates the growth of Mexican nationalism along the border. Carranza protested strongly against the
Pershing attack; at one point he ordered his generals to fight if
Pershing advanced farther south. Wilson attempted to use the withdrawal of the Pershing column by demanding that Carranza alter
his policies concerning foreign capital, but Carranza refused. 48 All
classes of border people sent Carranza emotional letters of support
and participated in popular demonstrations. The masses also requested weapons and military instruction. Essentially, they con-
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sidered armed intervention an intolerable attack on the national
sovereignty. These reactions reveal an attitude of solidarity, determination, and collective unity absent during the war of 1846 to
1848. 49
Even more interesting is the backing that Carranza received from
Mexicanos who resided in the Southwest. Recent immigrants were
determinedly loyal to Mexico. Given the growing unrest that appeared in southwestern cities after Pershing crossed the border,
many U. S. officials feared a Mexican revolt in support of Carranza. 50
This factor, along with an increasingly dangerous situation in Europe, may have prevented an even larger army from being sent
into northern Mexico.
Another event that strengthened the Carranza government was
the victory of the army, now a totally new group of volunteers, at
the battle of Carrizal. This triumph gave officers enormous prestige
and confidence. According to a British journalist, the tough attitude
of Gen. Jacinto B. TreviflO against the arrogant Pershing and Trevino's strategy during the battle were factors in forcing the invaders
to withdraw. 51 Carranza himself was prepared to initiate total warfare if such a measure were necessary to oust the North American.
troops. Much of the tension was dissipated when Gen. Alvaro Obregon entered into negotiations with Gen. Hugh Scott in EI Paso
for the removal of the Pershing expedition. Since the army was
the most important institution in Mexico, its increased stature was
a definite factor in border diplomacy. 52
Another feature of the border, the growing dissatisfaction of Mexican-American communities in the U. S., is evident in a serious
Mexican revolt in Texas. The Plan de San Diego began with a call
for blacks and native Americans to join Mexicans in seizing parts
of the Southwest and expelling the Anglo majority. Written in jail
by Huerta officers in 1914, the plan was predicated upon Mexican
and immigrant needs. Huerta authorities counted on the support
of blacks on the border to aid them in case Wilson decided to
mount an all-out invasion of Mexico. 53
In October 1915, the revolt began with the obvious support of
the Carranza government. It was the most aggressive action taken
by any Mexican regime since the times of Antonio Lopez de Santa
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and had to recruit volunteers, National Guardsmen, and Texas
Rangers because the bloody uprising eventually claimed hundreds
of lives. Carranza probably fomented the uprising to secure de
facto diplomatic recognition and to use the conflict as a lever to
begin negotiations for the withdrawal of the Pershing forces. 55
Before it ended, the revolt became a serious affair. In June 1916,
Gen. Juan Antonio Acosta boasted to Gen. Pablo Gonzalez that
"the revolution in Texas is assuming serious proportions and the
gringos are very scared. "56 Although this assertion is somewhat
exaggerated, violence did shake south Texas all along the border.
Many Anglos feared that a race war would soon break out if local
Mexicans joined the revolt. But once Carranza received diplomatic
recognition and the Pershing expedition departed, he had achieved
his objectives, and he kept the leaders out of Texas, terminating
support for further armed unrest until 1919. 57 Not since the days
of Juan Cortina had the Mexicanos decided upon a violent revolt
to overturn a system that did little to satisfY their socioeconomic
needs.
Clearly, then, Mexican border policy represented changes the
Revolution had unleashed. The decision to oppose U.S. intervention strengthened the Carranza government; nationalism arose to
new heights, and confidence in the government grew despite a
time of economic deprivation. Although Carranza established the
precedent of state regulation of the nation's wealth, foreign ownership of wealth increased to the point that U.S. and British interests were more active in the structure of the Mexican economy
by 1920 than in 1910. Carranza was probably willing to allow these
foreign interests to flourish since they provided jobs in northern
Mexico and stimulated commerce.
U.S. reaction to the immigrants was different from that of Mexico. As the bustling southwest economy began to need laborers,
planters, miners, and railroad interests succeeded in overturning
the restrictive immigrant legislation of 1917; but when the Mexican
braceros were not needed or the fear took hold that they were
dangerous radicals, they were deported or excluded.
On the other hand, Carranza's strategy with emigrants was pragmatic and humanitarian. The Mexican president sought allies to
forestall U.S. intervention and to gain diplomatic recognition. For
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forestall U.S. intervention and to gain diplomatic recognition. For
this reason he backed the Plan de San Diego revolt when it suited
him, but he also aided the migrants so that they would not become
allied with reactionary plotters who wanted to destroy his regime
and its nationalist ideology. Moreover, Carranza could not abide
the harsh treatment that Mexicans normally underwent after leaving his country. To maintain economic recovery, Carranza discouraged further emigration, but he also aided those who had left
the country in demanding better working and living conditions in
the United States.
Within a decade, the border was transformed from an open frontier to something resembling a war zone. The relative peace that
characterized the border before 1900 evaporated as civil war, ethnic
revolts, and exploitation became frequent border scenes. Old prejudices and injustices fueled the conflict as both nations battled to
gain economic advantages and carry out wartime strategies. Temporarily, Mexicans, immigrants, and Mexican-Americans united to
defend the government in Mexico City against the status quo in
the Southwest, and the gulf separating Hispanics from Anglos was
probably wider than ever. Undoubtedly, during the Revolution,
the border was farther from cultural pluralism and political harmony than at any other time in its modern history. Carranza's
~order policy reflected his determination to improve the treatment
of Mexican immigrants and to strengthen the Mexican economy
within the context of his fierce nationalism. Carranza's diplomatic
and military triumphs along the northern frontier demonstrate that
he was a clever strategist and an able statesman who enjoyed mass
support to a greater extent than is commonly recognized.
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*Funds from the University of Texas at Arlington Organized Research Fund
supported the travel and research for this study.
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GOOD NEWS AND BAD ON THE
MEXICAN FRONTIER: A REVIEW ESSAY

ELIZABETH A. H. JOHN

THE MEXICAN FRONTIER, 1821-1846: THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST UNDER MEXICO. By David J. Weber. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982.
Pp. 496. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. $19.95 cloth; $9.95 paper.
THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT David Weber's latest book is extraordinarily good news.
The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico is a
successful attack upon a long-standing, nearly intractable problem of Hispanic
Borderlands history. Although Mexican dominion spanned no more than a quarter
century in the present American Southwest, there are at issue the four markedly
diverse historic entities of Texas, New Mexico, Hispanic Arizona (then northern
Sonora), and California, each with a complex array of indigenous peoples in various
stages of acculturation. They must be understood in the contexts of the political
and economic agonies that marked the early decades of Mexican independence
from Spain and of the contemporaneous westward surge of the Anglo-Americans.
That segment of Mexico's history has yet to be satisfactorily studied, much less
comprehended. In contrast, there is a plethora of materials on the Anglo- American
frontier, but pervasive ethnocentrism limits their usefulness concerning the contiguous Hispanic frontier. Each of the four states has spawned a considerable
assortment of historical materials running the gamut of quality and accessibility,
but much of the basic documentary research has yet to be done on key questions.
Here has been a veritable Catch-22: research and publication in the field were
hardly ripe to support a valid, unifying construction; on the other hand, important
speCialized investigations floundered for lack of a framework within which to
formulate inquiry and construe findings.
Weber spent the 1970s cracking the dilemma, with the remarkably useful result
embodied in this volume. He nearly m1kes a virtue of the unevenness of the
materials as he judiciously leads the reader through the problems of evaluation
and construction, warning of limited or unsatisfactory evidence and pointing out
where further investigation is needed, carefully refraining from claiming too much
even while persuasively presenting his construction. The outcome is a historiographic and bibliographiC tour de force. Careful attention to the bibliographical
essay and footnotes will repay the reader with an unusually thorough, up-to-date
(1981) assessment of materials available on the Northern Mexican Borderlands
and pointers on topics for research. It will be for many years an indispensable
tool for any student of the region.
As the latest in the distinguished Histories of the American Frontier Series,
0028-6206/82/0700-0289 $.5010
© Regents, University of New Mexico
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this volume should reach a wider audience among students of American history
than do most Hispanic Borderlands studies and thus foster better comprehension
of the Hispanic dimension of this nation's history. With its 1821-1846 time span,
it would appear to complete for that series the coverage of the Hispanic frontier
that began with the equally indispensable Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 15131821 by John Francis Bannon (New York, 1970; Albuquerque, 1974), but a word
of caution is in order.
Bannon's task was the very different one of building upon Herbert Eugene
Bolton's seminal volume of 1921, The Spanish Borderlands, and incorporating
the vast new knowledge developed in the intervening half century of vigorous
Borderlands scholarship. Bannon was famously successful in that task, but his
volume deals very little with the years beyond 1795, reflecting the continuing
paucity of scholarship on the first two decades of the nineteenth century and the
dubious quality of much of the material then available on that period. For the
Frontier Series, the practical result is a gap of some quarter century in its coverage
of the Hispanic Borderlands, unfortunately spanning a critical time of tumultuous
change and little-known progress. Even such a sophisticated scholar as Weber is
thus left to perpetuate the misconception that the struggle for independence left
few scars in the Far North, when Texas was in fact devastated during the second
decade of the century; his interpretation of events on the Nacogdoches frontier
suffers particularly from that notion.
Weber's analysis is essentially topical: missions and church, presidios and other
military aspects, political development, economy, each examined in light of the
Spanish colonial roots and traced, locale by locale, through the changes and
continuities of the Mexican era. Specialists in the several geographic and subject
areas will surely question some interpretations and offer amplificatons; such exchanges should accelerate development of the field. The fundamental soundness
of Weber's construction, however, seems to be such that the dialogue will run
more to "yes, but" than to "nay."
Although Weber warns that we have yet an imperfect understanding of the
workings of government in Mexico's Far North, he explains very well the practical
difficulties suffered and the solutions improvised in the frontier polities while
federalists and centralists fought to control, even as they wrecked, the national
government. Particularly useful perspectives emerge from his treatment of the
much-studied Texas revolt in the context of the less known contemporaneous
revolts in California, Sonora, and New Mexico, and the regional and personal
rivalries that rent each of the four.
Weber's treatment seems strongest in the economic dimension, which figures
importantly throughout the book, notwithstanding his surprising assertion of the
"advantage" of "proximity to the dynamic economy of the United States." Since
he traces processes by which involvement with that economy fostered class distinctions in once egalitarian frontier societies, especially debt peonage, and ultimately cost Mexico a third of its patrimony, making the pobladores "foreigners
in their native land," one may question the cost-benefit analysis. More persuasive
is his exposition of the nineteenth-century Mexican dilemma in the context of the
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continuing difficulty of under-developed nations today: how to attract but still
control foreign capital and trade.
The social aspects fare less well. Although the declining role of the institutional
church is ably expounded, the powerful continuing role of the faith as a fundamental force in Borderlands life is neglected. The Indian dimension of the study
suffers from overriding emphasis on "constant warfare" with indios btirbaros,
although peaceful interaction with Indians as neighbors, coreligionists, comrades
in arms, fellow citizens, and trading partners characterized the "inclusive frontier"
of the Hispanic Borderlands during the Mexican as during the Spanish era. That
imbalance reflects problems inherent in the sources available to Weber as well
as uncertain grasp of the regional ethnology. Satisfactory treatment of southwestern social history demands fuller use of cultural anthropology than was deemed
practicable in this pioneering effort.
While the book's potential as catalyst is impressive throughout, it is especially
evident in the concluding chapter, "The Mexican Frontier in Perspective." Given
the constraints of the series format, Weber touches only lightly, but most provocatively, upon the issues of comparative frontier history, towards which this
study contributes a wealth of material. If students of other frontiers now rally
with Weber and his fellow Borderlanders to exploit the analytical possibilities
raised by this volume, comparative frontier perspectives should soon be much
enriched.
How does the book relate to existing works? It stands alone as pioneer construction, much as did Bolton's The Spanish Borderlands fifty years ago. The
extent to which it relies upon, corroborates, or casts doubt upon other published
works is so thoroughly and fairly treated by Weber himself in the bibliographic
essay that it will be more useful here to examine its potential as foundation and
stimulus for new work on the long neglected Mexican frontier.
Not the least of its virtues is its timeliness. Concomitant with the surge of
Hispanic population in the Southwest is a burgeoning interest in the relevant
historical background. Meanwhile, there is in progress a massive growth in the
availability of documents for research.
Only recently have published works begun to reflect the progress sparked in
the 1960s by the calendaring and microfilming of the Spanish and Mexican archives
of New Mexico and the Bexar Archives of Spanish and Mexican Texas, both under
the auspices of the National Historical Publications Commission. Just now underway at the Texas State Archives is a complementary two-year program to
calendar and microfilm the Nacogdoches Archives, thanks to grants from the
Brown Foundation of Houston and the Kathryn Stoner O'Connor Foundation of
Victoria. Already in press at the same institution is a new calendar of documents
bearing principally on the Mexican period that were lately identified as a longmisplaced segment of the Lamar Papers. Various other microfilming and calendaring projects are underway, or marking time till funded, on both sides of the
international border.
Greatest of all in long-range potential is the development of a comprehensive
new facility for the Archivo General de la Nacion in the unlikely setting of the
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old Lecumberri prison in Mexico City, now ingeniously remodeled to house all
the long-scattered materials of the archive and provide secure, convenient access
to them. Fortunately, the AGN continues with all practicable speed its development of finding aids. Its leadership is said now to be addressing also some longstanding problems of lesser archives throughout the country, the northernmost
of which are vitally important to Borderlands research.
The situation is a rapidly changing one in which scholars must be alert for
current reports such as that presented by Dan Tyler at the Western History
Association meeting in October 1981 upon Mexican archival materials for research
in New Mexican history. That paper was a partial, interim report upon a guide
now in preparation with grant support from the National Endowment for the
Humanities.
Fortunately, Borderlands scholars have an incomparable, on-going resource in
the Newsletter of the Southwestern Mission Research Center, which published
its volume 15, number 50, in December 1981. From their base at the Arizona
State Museum in Tucson, the SMRC staff maintain close contact with the archival
situation in Mexico and with a wide range of developments of interest to Borderlanders, all of which are reported in their Newsletter along with a comprehensive, interdisciplinary bibliographic service.
Yet another major contribution came from SMRC in 1981, with publication by
the University of Arizona Press of Northern New Spain, A Research Guide by
Thomas C. Barnes, Thomas H. Naylor, and Charles W. Polzer. It is at once the
most comprehensive and the most concise compilation of information needed by
scholars in tackling the vast documentary legacy of the Hispanic Borderlands.
Fortunately, it is so modestly priced as to be a feasible, as well as essential, part
of every scholar's equipment.
That research guide evolved as a tool for an even more ambitious SMRC project:
the Documentary Relations of the Southwest Computer Access Bibliography.
There is already a substantial beginning on their long-range program of indexing
the major archival sources for the Hispanic Borderlands from earliest times to
1850. The initial concentration is upon the colonial era, but as speedily as funding
and time permit, the project will offer for the Mexican era too a virtual explosion
of accessible primary documentation.
Another significant Borderlands enterprise may well germinate next October
at an informal session on problems of translation that is scheduled for the Western
History Association meeting at Phoenix. Scholars will then consider the cooperative development ofa comprehensive Northern Borderlands lexicon. Preliminary
inquiries indicate an enthusiastic response from scholars; SMRC has in place the
requisite computer capability. The question of funding seems the only likely
deterrent to early realization of a long-needed research tool.
Why harp on funding? That, of course, is the bad news. Most of the progress
discussed above, including Weber's work, has been made possible, or at least
greatly facilitated, by support from federal agencies that have now fallen upon
hard times. There is every danger that the funding crisis will balk for many years
the progress that should follow speedily upon the advances of the last decade.
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Some remedy may be found in the private sector, as seen in the support of the
Brown and O'Connor foundations for the Nacogdoches Archives project. Can
Borderlands scholars convey the importance and the current relevance of their
enterprise so urgently as to amass the large funds required for major documentary
projects on the one hand and, on the other, secure the relatively small sums so
sorely needed to facilitate the work of individual scholars?
Whatever the rate of progress in our understanding of the Mexican Borderlands
in coming decades, it will owe much to the foundation David Weber has laid.
How very fortunate that his book is eminently politic in two senses: not only an
astute exercise in the art of the possible, but also in diplomacy. Much of the
anticipated progress depends upon the active cooperation of Mexican scholars and
their government. Weber's sensitive, fair treatment of a period fraught with pain
for Mexico will surely help to foster the scholarly interchange so essential to
historical comprehension on both sides of the border.

CALVIN HORN CONTEST AND HISTORY DAY
This year the Calvin Horn contest and History Day were combined.
More than 500 students entered regional competitions throughout the
state. Sixty-six were finalists in the state contest.
Calvin Horn winners were:
First place, $350: Jennifer C. Pixton, Eldorado High School, Albuquerque, "The
Mormon Battalion"
Second place, $250: Jenette Gatewood, Dora High School, Dora, "John S. Chisum's Role in the Lincoln County War"
Third place, $150: Delisa Belcher, Dora High School, Dora, "History of Roosevelt
County Schools"
First place History Day winners included:
Senior paper, open category: Randy G. Walker, Eldorado High School, Albuquerque
Junior paper: Maxine M. Stelling, Grant Middle School, Albuquerque
Senior paper: Kelly L. Knuth, Eldorado High School, Albuquerque
Junior individual project: Kristi Caudill, Lovington
Senior individual project: Gretchen Yanz, Cibola High School, Albuquerque
Junior group project: Sandy J. Gardner, Sue Fellingham, La Plata Junior High
School, Silver City
Senior group project: MelissaA. Arciero, Karla Serna, Marla Serna, Lydia Romero,
C. C. Snell Junior High School, Bayard
Junior project, open category: Stewart Pratt, Lea Elementary School, Lovington,
New Mexico
Senior project, open category: Craig A. Alcone, Shawn Stomp, Lauran Harrison,
Eldorado High School, Albuquerque
Senior individual performance: Ruth A. Long, Eldorado High School, Albuquerque
Senior group performance: Maria E. Cordova, Kassandra Ponzio, Denise Garcia,
Ruby Rios, C. C. Snell Junior High School, Bayard
Junior media presentation: Paul D. Chambliss, Taylor Middle School, Lovington
Senior media presentation: Mark Nowak, Lou Rose, Rick Overbay, Mary Mayer,
Julie McCormack, Sandia High School, Albuquerque

Outstanding teachers honored include Jeannette French of St. Pius
High School, Albuquerque, and Patricia Thatcher of Dora High School,
Dora.
The theme for next year's history day will be "People, Places, and
Events That Have Changed History." For further information contact Dr.
Lynette Oshima, Mesa Vista Hall 3033, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 87131 or call 277-4115.

Book Reviews
NORTHERN NEW SPAIN: A RESEARCH GUIDE. By Thomas C. Barnes, Thomas H.
Naylor, and Charles W. Polzer. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1981. Pp.
xii, 147. Illus., glossary, bibliog. $9.95 paper.
ALL PERSONS TEACHING or conducting research in the field of Spanish colonial
history in the area of northern New Spain can make use of this valuable new tool.
For the novice, a research guide such as this can save many hours normally spent
in understanding the types of documentation available and how various collections
may be utilized. The section devoted to basic paleography will help the beginning
translator deal with handwriting and abbreviations. For the experienced researcher, it gives quick access to widely scattered information, as in the convenient
summaries of colonial officials, civilian and religious, throughout the viceroyalty
of New Spain.
Basically, the guide makes use of materials gathered for the Documentary
Relations of the Southwest (DRSW) Project Manual edited by Charles W. Polzer.
An explanation of the DRSW master index and computer access is included.
Other chapters cover types and classifications of documents (e.g. administrative,
military, ciVil, and ecclesiastical); documentary collections arranged by regional
depositories in Mexico, Spain, and other countries; the structure of colonial government; the political evolution of Northern New Spain; nomenclature of native
groups; and some locator maps keyed for the computer access Geofile and system
of site designation employed by certain institutions in the Southwest.
In any attempt to compile and simplify information, problems occur. The glossary is a genuinely good effort to reduce terms to a basic translation and explanation. In some cases, however, words are given specialized meanings that are
applicable in certain situations but not others. For example, beneficio, ejido, gente
de raz6n, lavadero, and rancheria all have meanings beyond the ones listed.
The chapter on weights and measures is extremely complete, but one must keep
in mind the pOSSibility of inaccurate equivalents because of variations in time and
space. Values of money and currency are also subject to the same limitations. The
chapter on racial terminology includes almost every known combination but does
not analyze classifications with regard to social status.
Despite any minor limitations, thisgui~brings together an exhaustive amount
of information designed to make research less ofa chore in Spanish colonial history.
It is a must not only for those working in northern New Spain, but its listing of
general guides and aids to collections makes it a stepping stone to further investigation of the whole field. An indispensable teaching aid, it will be appreciated
by all those instructing persons in a complex area of research.

University of San Diego

IRIS H. W. ENGSTRAND
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THE YAQUIS: A CULTURAL HISTORY. By Edward H. Spicer. Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1980. Pp. xiv, 393. IlIus., index, notes, references. $28.50 cloth;
$14.50 paper.
THIS WORK IS ASIGNIFICANT achievement in southwestern history and anthropology. As he has done in nine previous books, Edward H. Spicer combines history
and ethnography in a sensitively written narrative. His latest work represents
four hundred years of Yaqui cultural adjustment and change. Spicer began his
Yaqui research at Pascua, Arizona, in 1936, and extended it to the Mexican Yaqui
town of Potam, Sonora, in 1941. The book is the culmination of forty years of
research and rumination. It is a balanced historical account of the turbulent Yaqui
past.
Spicer begins his history with a long introduction, "Yaquis Enter the European
Crucible," that dates from 1617 and the Yaqui conversion by Jesuits to Catholicism.
The larger history of settlement of the northern colonial frontier of New Spain,
and indeed Yaqui history, is placed within the context of Spain's decline from her
commanding position in European affairs. Spicer then follows with alternate chapters of ethnography and history. He discusses at length Yaqui religion and religious
arts; Yaqui relations with hacendados from the expulsion of the Jesuits to the
Mexican Revolution of 1910; the Yaqui town, Yaqui history since the revolution;
and Yaqui "identity." His final chapter, "An Enduring People," contains an analysis
of Spicer's definition of culture. He writes that like "peoples better known to
history such as the Irish, the Basques, the Iroquois, and the Mayas, Yaquis also
faced the threat of political domination and cultural absorption" (p. 333). And like
many peoples of Europe and North America, they found means to maintain their
identity, if not politically, then culturally. In meeting the test of survival in "the
crucible of nations," they came to participate in a general human type, which the
author identifies as an "Enduring People" whose identity includes the material
as well as the less frequently explained immaterial attributes of culture. It is in
his analysis of the immaterial realm of Yaqui culture-ideas and traditions-that
Spicer writes with great delicacy and grace so that the reader, in learning about
the subtle meaning of Yaqui symbol and myth, begins to comprehend that it was
not merely fertile, irrigable land for which Yaquis fought and died in the nineteenth
century, but also for "those places where life was most intensely realized" (p. 334).
Spicer's prose is often pleasing and his tone always humane.
The Yaqui has been printed in double-column format, doubtlessly to save space
and to accommodate the more than 100 photographs and drawings of Rosamond
B. Spicer, the author's wife. Although the print is small, it is still easily read.
Spicer has also included twenty-one maps and ten diagrams of ceremonial events
(also drawn by his wife). The book is a masterful work that will be read for years
to come as the standard source on Yaqui culture and history.

Northern Arizona University

L. G. MOSES
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INDEH, AN APACHE ODYSSEY. By Eve Ball, with Nora Henn and Lynda Sanchez.
Foreword by Dan L. Thrapp. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press,
1980. Pp. xxi, 334. Illus., bibliog., index. $19.95.
THERE ARE NUM EROUS CASES in which American Indian historical narratives mainly
based on written documentation often lack a crucial evidential element. In such
instances, the critical ingredient that is generally absent is oral testimony of those
Indians who were participants in the events being described. This situation certainly holds true for much that has been written concerning Chiricahua Apache
history. Indeh, An Apache Odyssey, whose contribution stems from its attempt
to redress this imbalance, is a synthesis of Eve Ball's thirty-year accumulation of
Chiricahua oral testimony.
Indeh is an interesting collection of fifty-five vignettes from the Indian viewpoint, which span Chiricahua Apache history, roughly from 1850 through 1930.
Especially noteworthy are the vivid descriptions of and rather profound insights
into the personalities of Juh and Cochise. Also covered exceptionally well are
topics treating the Mescalero Indian Reservation, Bureau of Indian Affairs agent
James A. Carroll, and Blazer's Mill. Yet there are several serious omissions. Little
is learned about the Chiricahuas' experiences as prisoners of war. Ironically, nothing is learned about their Mescalero reservation experience.
Such paucity of information should cause the reader to use Indeh with caution.
A particular difficulty with Indeh is that it is solely based upon oral accounts.
What makes this problem rather troublesome is that out of some 160 Chiricahua
and Mescalero Indian informants listed in the bibliography, the information used
is provided by only thirteen individuals. Of this amount, at least three-fourths of
the book rests on Asa Daklugie's (Geronimo's nephew and leader of the faction
that moved from Oklahoma to New Mexico) interpretation ofwhat befell his people
and his role in such episodes-some ofwhich is not substantiated by extant archival
documentation. As with any records, oral history testimony must be compared
against other sources for the sake of historical accuracy. Use of available archival
and manuscript material would have made Indeh a more balanced work and would
have avoided some errors of fact.
Indeh also suffers from several stylistic problems. There is lacking in the work
any coherent organization; the book's three major divisions are not integrated.
Also, there is absent from the various sketches a unifYing narrative thread. None
of them includes any reference to the time in which particular events occui-red,
nor are they arranged sequentially. As such, it is recommended that the reader
consult, for example, Dan Thrapp's The Conquest ofApacheria to place Indeh in
a better historical framework. This will enable the reader to obtain a deeper
appreciation of Indeh, which, in any case, ought to be read for some of the
Chiricahua view of southwestern Indian history that it provides.

Northern Arizona University
Phoenix Center

JOHN ANTHONY TURCHENESKE, JR.
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NAVAJO ARCHITECTURE: FORMS, HISTORY, DISTRIBUTION. By Stephen C. Jett and
Virginia E. Spencer. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1981. Pp. xix, 289.
Illus., index, notes, bibliog., appendix. $37.50 cloth; $14.95 paper.
OVER THE PAST HALF CENTURY the Navajos have attracted more attention from
scholars than any other North American tribe, and possibly more attention than
any other tribal people in the world. There are several reasons why so many
North American specialists have been drawn to the Navajos. The most obvious
reason is that they are numerically the largest of the North American tribes.
Almost as important is the fact that they have been able to maintain their cultural
integrity to a far greater extent than almost any other tribe. However, the most
important factor is that Navajo culture exhibits significant temporal and regional
variability. Navajo cultural variability has proven to be a blessing and a curse to
the academic community. While researchers have been blessed by an area rich
in research problems, they have been cursed by the development of a literature
that, in large part, consists of a seemingly endless stream of narrowly defined,
synchronic studies that are relevant to only a single community or region. There
has been no single "comprehensive" study of the Navajos, and there never will
be. Comprehensive topical or regional studies are the only alternatives, and few
researchers have had the courage to attempt such studies. Thus, this study of
Navajo architecture by Stephen Jett and Virginia Spencer is important and exciting
because it is one of the few comprehensive topical studies of the Navajos to
combine detailed treatment of the subject matter with analysis of temporal and
regional variation.
Jett and Spencer discuss the full range of Navajo architecture, starting with the
early Athapaskans and ending with the contemporary Navajos. Much of the book
is devoted to the origins, evolutions, and forms of dwellings. The full range of
known hogan forms are discussed in detail, and Navajo-built houses are also
extensively covered. In their discussion of dwellings, they have included furnishings, stoves, hearth, storage pits, meal bins, etc., as well as construction
techniques. In addition, the authors also examine a wide range of other types of
structures Navajos built. Corrals, sweathouses, fences, field structures, windbreaks, tents, ovens, shrines, graves, and privies are only a few of the categories
that are included. Not only are all of these structures described as fully as possible
in the text, but the study is profusely illustrated with more than 200 photographs
and line drawings.
The authors' detailed discussions of the various types of Navajo structures is
followed by analysis of regional and temporal variation in Navajo architecture. By
focusing on dwellings they are able to indicate the historical and regional environmental factors that influenced the variations in Navajo architecture.
Jett and Spencer should be commended for having written what is definitely
a monumental work. On the book cover, it is stated that this study "may well be
the most complete study to date of the folk architecture of a tribal society." Not
being a specialist in folk architecture, I am unable to comment on this statement.
I can say, however, that this book is one of the most significant studies of the
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Navajos to be published in recent decades and is certainly the definitive work on
Navajo architecture. While there is little doubt as to this book's immense value
to scholars, the nonspecialist interested in either the Navajos or American Indians
should not be frightened by the title. The detailed discussions of Navajo architecture are placed within broader discussions of Navajo culture. This approach
makes the study comprehensible to the nonspecialist and has resulted in a book
that is engrossing and enjoyable to read.

University of Tulsa

GARRICK A. BAILEY

SOUTHWESTERN WEAVING. By Marian E. Rodee. Second edition. Albuquerque:
Maxwell Museum of Anthropology and the University of New Mexico Press,
1981. Pp. xvii, 176. Illus., glossary, bibliog. $14.95 paper.
OLD NAVAJO RUGs: THEIR DEVELOPMENT FROM 1900 TO 1940. By Marian E.
Rodee. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 113. Illus.,
bibliog., index. $25.00 cloth; $15.95 paper.
THE HISTORY OF WEAVING in the Southwest originates with the prehistoric ancestors of today's Pueblo peoples. The arrival of the Spanish, with their herds of
sheep and treadle loom, added new materials and technology to the development
of textile arts in the region. Navajo weavers translated elements from Pueblo and
Spanish cultures into a textile tradition distinctively Navajo. Marian Rodee's two
recent books contribute to the growing corpus on southwestern weaving in general, and Navajo weaving in particular.
The most salient characteristic of both volumes is the extensive use of museum
collections as the basic research tool. The first edition of Southwestern Weaving,
published in 1977 by the University of New Mexico Press and the Maxwell Museum of Anthropology, utilized the collection at the Maxwell Museum to summarize the post-contact evolution of weaving. This is an important collection,
owing much of its distinction to Gilbert Maxwell, a Navajo trader who died in
1980. Maxwell acquired his textiles with a keen collector's eye and an equally
keen trader's savvy. Maxwell's collection, which was donated to the museum in
1963, comprises the nucleus of the museum's southwestern textile holdings. The
collection subsequently has been enriched through additional gifts of contemporary weavings. Rodee's book does not attempt to provide an exhaustive or
definitive study of the history and technology of southwestern weaving; rather it
comprises a research catalogue, utilizing numerous color plates and black and
white photographs of the collection to illustrate significant developments in the
textile arts of the Southwest. A detailed technical description (i.e. warp:weft count,
fiber, type of yarn, spin, twist, ply and dye) is provided for each illustrated piece.
Both editions also contain a helpful glossary that would have been enhanced by
drawings or illustrations of some of the more technical terms. The principal virtue
of t.he second edition is the inclusion of an introduction, which places Maxwell,
the collector, in the context of his collection. The discussion provides a personal
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and historic dimension to the collecting process and the textiles themselves. A
brief commentary on textile conservation, also included in the introduction, is
useful to private and institutional collectors.
While both editions of Southwestern Weaving focus exclusively on the collection
at the Maxwell Museum, the basic data utilized in Old Navajo Rugs derive from
museum collections throughout the country. The book traces the development of
Navajo weaving from 1900 to 1940, a period characterized by the elaboration of
regional styles. Illustrations from the C. N. Cotton and J. B. Moore mail-order
catalogues provide particularly valuable insights into the influence of these early
traders on the evolution of twentieth-century rug patterns specifically designed
and marketed to appeal to East Coast Anglo buyers. Subsequent discussion of the
contributions of Lorenzo Hubbell and others delineates the unique role such
traders played in the history of the reservation and in the development of the
regional Navajo rug. A brief description of the collaboration between Mary Cabot
Wheelwright and Cozy McSparron in the introduction of the ill-fated chrome
dyes also is of interest. Rodee's discourse on the importance of fibers and dyes
to dating and identifying old Navajo rugs provides much useful information, although again, technical drawings 'would have Clarified her analysis. On balance,
Old Navajo Rugs presents a carefully researched and well-illustrated history of
Navajo weaving in the first half of the twentieth century. In her brief "Afterword,"
Rodee cautions against applying regional standards to today's weavers. The isolation that reinforced regional weaving styles is a condition of the past. The
contemporary weaver is an individual artist, responding to a multitude of influences-including books like Marian Rodee's. Both her recent volumes are of value
to scholars, collectors, weavers, and the reader with a general interest in southwestern Indian art and the history of the Southwest.

Wheelwright Museum of the American Indian

SUSAN MCGREEVY

THE NAVAJO NATION. By Peter Iverson. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981.
Contributions in Ethnic Studies, Number 3. Pp. xxxii, 273. Notes, bibliog.,
index. $25.00.
THE READER WHO PICKS UP this book must realize at the outset that this is not an
encyclopedic history of the Navajo from their early, paleo-Indian days to the
present. Instead, Peter Iverson focuses on the last five decades of the tribe's
history. It'is current history brought up to the near-present that traces tribal
economic, political, and legal activities, since it is within those areas that Iverson
sees an emerging Navajo nationalism. One could argue that the formation of the
kind of intense loyalty to a nation that constitutes "nationalism" should include a
discussion of artistic and other cultural indicators or trends. Even within the more
limited context Iverson presents a convincing case that the Navajos are moving
toward self-determination. Their wish is to establish a separate ethnic identity
through control of their political system, health care and schools, and the reser-
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vation's economic development. The tribe's goal is simply greater independence
within the national fabric.
When Peter MacDonald was elected tribal chairman in 1970, for the first of
three terms, it marked a turning point in Navajo relations with the federal government and the beginning of the movement towards self-determination. Under
his leadership the tribe increasingly began to control their legal services, health
care, and public education. The author's discussion of the latter is especially
insightful, noting the creation of a unique curriculum and the many attendant
problems and conflicts. Along with control in those key areas, MacDonald spearheaded the drive to gain more control over the tribe's economic livelihood, not
an easy matter considering the many legal entities and the powerful corporations
with which the tribe has had to contend. Finally, as Iverson and MacDonald
observe, the tribe is getting the respect of the United States government. The
author's unabashed admiration for the chairman colors some of his judgments and
precludes an objective critique of this outstanding and controversial Native American leader. With that said, the study comes as close as any recent attempt by a
non-Indian to achieve the delicate balance between overt empathy and impartiality of a provocative subject.
The introduction and chapter I are the only weak parts of the book. In the
introduction an attempt is made to place the Navajo Emergence Myth into a
historical context, but the interpretation and synthesis show a lack of familiarity
with the many studies that have examined the myth. Nowhere does he show that
he is acquainted with the work of Leland Wyman, the more recent work of Karl
Luckert, or Sheila Moon's A Magic Dwells: A Poetic and Psychological Study of
the Navaho Emergence Myth (1972). In chapter I he notes Robert Young's and
David Brugge's comments about the initial, amicable relations between the Pueblo
and the newly arrived Navajos, but he ignores completely the major work by Jack
Forbes, Apache, Navaho and Spaniard (1960). Forbes, basing his conclusions on
a thorough study of Spanish documents, suggests that emnity-in the form of
raiding and warfare-and friendship characterized the relationship between Puebloan and Athapaskan before Spanish Indian policy began to alter it into constant
hostility. Elsewhere there are a number of typographical mistakes that mar the
book: Governador Knob for Gobernador Knob (p. xxviii, but correct on p. 3);
Arate Salmeron for Fray Geronimo de Zarate Salmeron (pp. 3, 271); and [E.
B.] Merit for Edgar B. Meritt (p. 21).
Notwithstanding the incidental criticisms noted above, Iverson offers a straightforward, descriptive narrative of recent Navajo history, although probably not as
interpretive and analytical as some might wish. While he relies heavily on newspaper accounts, the bibliography is extensive and inclusive, indicating a good
grasp of the sources. The ad:vantage of having lived on the reservation for several
years and knowing many of the personalities has aided in the detailing of events.
It is a welcome addition to the growing literature on this politically and economically important tribe.

Seattle, Washington

MICHAEL

J.

WARNER
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DRINKING BEHAVIOR AMONG SOUTHWESTERN INDIANS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Jack O. Waddell and Michael W. Everett. Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1980. Pp. xxix, 248. Illus., index, notes. $9.95
paper.
To PERSONS WHO HAVE a professional or general interest in the perplexing problems of alcohol among American Indians, this volume provides some revealing
insights into how Indian groups view drinking. The descriptions of drinking behavior come from four southwestern groups: urban Papagos, by Jack B. Waddell;
Taos Pueblo, by Donald N. Brown; Navajo adolescents by Martin D. Topper; and
White Mountain Apaches, by Michael W. Everett. While the authors are not
Indian, their essays show some of the methods by which contemporary anthropologists seek to identify beliefs and behavior as they are viewed from within a
particular culture. Following are commentaries by five Native Americans who
have had practical experience in community alcoholism and mental health programs: Fernando Escalante, Richard Cooley, Maurice W. Miller, Don Ostendorf,
and Ron Wood. In introductory and concluding essays the editors set these papers
in historical and comparative perspective. The combination of academic and applied anthropology focused on a contemporary social problem is noteworthy
throughout the volume.
Waddell first gives a detailed summary of the aboriginal background of alcohol
use in the Southwest. The Papago is the only one of the four groups in which
alcohol (a native sahuaro cactus wine) had played a central and sacred role in
agricultural ritual. While the Apache had acquired a native corn beer from Mexican
Indians, it was used primarily in a social rather than a sacred context. All four
were heavily influenced by the frontier drinking patterns introduced by whites.
Today in all four groups drinking is seen as having positive functions in maintaining
social ties and releasing tensions.
Topper's essay on Navajo adolescent drinking presents most fully the methods,
based on linguistics and cognitive anthropology, used to identifv native beliefs
and behavior. Through interviews with "young men who drink'; he constructs,
first, a four-level taxonomy of drinkers as classified by the Navajo and, then, their
"verbal action plans" for drinking in two key situations: "how young men drink
in groups at dances" (high school stomp dances and adult squaw dances) and "how
older men drink alone." He analyzes the functions of group drinking: for social
pleasure with friends, to demonstrate manhood, and to try to escape from the
stresses that bear especially heavily on young men in the Navajo matrilineal family
structure and under the pressures of social change.
Despite many similarities in the contemporary drinking behavior described for
the four groups, each also shows culturally specific characteristics: for example,
the Papago tribal history of ritual drinking and their association of the effects of
drinking with spirit powers; the Navajo discomfort in off-reservation bars as compared with informal drinking groups at their own dances and ceremonies; the
Apache phrasing of "trouble" that comes from drinking (taking offense from convivial joking or teasing that can lead quickly to retaliation, violence, and even
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"revenge suicide"). Lone drinkers are seen as problematical in all four groups;
social drinking is acceptable so long as it does not lead to undesirable consequences. While these communities express disapproval of excessive drinking that
leads to neglect offamily responsibilities or to violence, they seem to have difficulty
in applying their own sanctions to curb excesses.
The commentaries of the five Indian alcoholism and mental health workers
focus on treatment programs. They recognize the strong social pressures toward
drinking that contribute to the difficulty of control. They note that some Anglo
concepts of mental health are alien to Indian thinking (e.g., group discussion of
personal problems, acknowledging alcoholism as a disease). They all emphasize
the importance of Indian participation in the development and direction of treatment programs, and some stress the usefulness of Indian "ex-alcoholics" in these
programs.
While this volume offers no solutions to the problems of Indian drinking, it is
a rich source of information and insights, from anthropologists and practitioners,
for understanding these problems and ultimately for developing means for their
control.

American University

KATHERINE SPENCER HALPERN

THE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA. By Rennard Strickland. Norman: University of Okalhoma Press, 1980. Pp. xvi, 171. lIlus., notes, bibliog. $9.95 cloth; $3.95 paper.
AT FIRST GLANCE IT MIGHT seem odd for the University of Oklahoma Press to issue
a volume on Indians as part of its series Newcomers in a New Land. Yet the
ancestors of most present-day Oklahoma Indians came to the area as immigrants.
The best-known and earliest arrivals were the Five Tribes-Cherokees, Creeks,
Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles-who were removed from their homes in
the southeastern United States in the 1830s. Over the years several more groups,
including tribes from other parts of the "Permanent Indian Frontier," were forced
into the two territories that became the state of Oklahoma.
Since whole tribes came to have their homes there, a book on the Indians of
Oklahoma is a more justifiable project than the studies of other ethnic groups
embraced in the Newcomers series. The German, Poles, British, et al. of Oklahoma are not easily defined as communities for historical purposes. The author
of this volume argues that even within an American Indian context, the Indians
of Oklahoma are unique.
In contrast to the other contributors to the series, Professor Strickland has a
topic that is too large for the series format. To write a book with the brevity
required, he wisely chose to produce an impressionistic essay.
The organization of The Indians of Oklahoma is based upon an "Oklahoma
Indian calendar," each of the four chapters representing a "season." The chapters
and the approximate periods they cover are "The Bright Autumn of Indian Nationhood" (from the beginning of the removal policy to the end of the Civil War);
"The Dark Winter of Settlement and Statehood" (ca. 1867 to 1907); "The Long
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Spring of Tribal Renewal" (1907 to the present); and "The Spirit of a Modern
Indian Summer" (the present, with some thoughts on the future).
This is a sensitive, affectionate treatment. The tragedies brought about by white
greed, callousness, and good intentions are noted, and in a calm way the sorrows
they produced are effectively underscored. Yet no time is spent on heavy-handed
condemnation and moralizing.
The emphasis is on cultural matters. The author, a professor of law, does what
we historians so often preach and too seldom practice: he bravely and successfully
uses Indian poetry, art, songs, tales, and novels as his main sources. Happily
absent is extended discussion of "famous" Indians, i. e., those who have succeeded
in the white man's political, business, and academic circles.
Strickland appreciates the immense diversity of Oklahoma Indian life: the differences among tribes, factions within tribes, and generation gaps among families.
Yet he insists that a cultural unity exists among Indians of the state.
This book is a product of the general rise of ethnic consciousness and pride
among America's minorities since World War II; as such it will appeal to many
Indians, in and out of Oklahoma. But non-Indians will also appreciate the author's
genuine concern to share a sense of Indianness with all readers. He wants to
instill an awareness of the Indian's values, not a sense of guilt over past wrongs.
And Indianness, for Strickland, is far more a cultural than a racial matter.
University of Nevada, Reno

MICHAELJ. BRODHEAD

THE MEXICANS IN OKLAHOMA. By Michael M. Smith. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1980. Pp. v, 78. Notes, bibliog., illus. $2.95 paper.
FOR OVER A CENTURY AMERICAN students of migration generally overlooked or
ignored Mexican immigration as a movement worthy of careful research. Although
Anglos of the West seized half of their country, utilized their labor, pursued them
back and forth across the border and even borrowed their vocabulary (note canyon,
mesa, rodeo, bronco, buckaroo, calaboose, etc.), Mexicans were seldom taken
seriously. Professor Smith suggests that this was because the migrants tended to
accept their position and preferred to preserve and survive rather than attempt
to change the system. Most Mexican peones were from patriarchal, extended
families; they accepted the paternalism of their emotionally secure villages, and
they long remained ill-equipped to compete in a society proclaiming laissez-faire
individualism. They were generally illiterate, disinterested in American citizenship, not easily assimilated and uniformly labeled unambitious, docile, and noncompetitive by their employers. Clearly, Mexican migrants did not squint toward
the horizon; they did not seek a West uncrowded, unfettered, vital and free; they
did not personify the romanticized American dream. Rather they were seeking
something more basie--survival.
Since World War II the staggering number of Mexicans entering the United
States, their need for employment, the needs of agriculture, construction, and
service industries for cheap labor, along with the very real socioeconomic problems
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now being faced in the United States, has finally forced the subject of immigration
onto the American consciousness. Professor Smith's book, however, is more in
the historical tradition than an attempt at sociological analysis and interpretation.
(Only about six pages of the work is devoted to the period since World War II.)
Emphasis is given to the Spanish explorers, to political pressures in Mexico, to
the era of railroad building in the Southwest, and to the mining and cotton
industries of Oklahoma. Both the outward thrust and the inward pull of Mexican
migration is considered. Of course, Oklahoma was never a major center for Mexican settlement (only 134 Mexican residents were in the two territories in 1900;
2,645 were in the state in 1910; 6,697 in 1920; 3,496 in 1930; 1,425 in 1940).
Clearly, the long period of economic depression of the 1930s led to a general
Mexican exodus from the state.
To relate the Mexican migration to a specific state, particularly a distant, noncontiguous, late-maturing state like Oklahoma creates difficult limitations. However, individualized case studies, use of the Immigration Commission report on
Oklahoma coal mining of 1911, and observations on local religious and cultural
institutions help to unifY, personalize, and give character to the work.
This volume is one of ten to be found in a University of Oklahoma Press series
entitled Newcomers to a New Land. The studies are brief, summary in nature,
and directed to a nonacademic audience. The recognition that thousands of immigrants failed and that suffering and sacrifice was the lot of the typical settler
on the Oklahoma prairie should help elevate all immigrants to a historic place in
the popular American psyche.

University of Nevada, Reno

WILBUR'S. SHEPPERSON

INDIAN TRADERS ON THE MIDDLE BORDER: THE HOUSE OF EWING, 1827-54. By
Robert A. Trennert, Jr. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981. Pp. xiii,
271. IlIus., notes, index, bibliog. $17.95.
WILLIAM GRIFFITH EWING (1801-1854) and George Washington Ewing (18041866) were born into a restless frontier family. While they were growing up, the
father operated a tavern and general store at Piqua in the relatively unsettled
frontier of western Ohio, a center of Indian trade on the edges of increasing
Indian-white tensions and a military staging area during the War of 1812.
After studying and practicing law for a brief period, William returned to the
family, now in Fort Wayne, Indiana, where the father had recently established
himself as a merchant. In 1825, the two boys and their father formed a loose
copartnership to pool their resourCeS and moved rapidly into the Indian trade.
Soon they began a long association with a New York merchandising house and
were competing with Astor's American Fur Company that tended to dominate
the Great Lakes area.
When the father died in 1827, the sons bound themselves in copartnership as
W. G. & G. W. Ewing. The House of Ewing operated on the Middle Border,
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"the area that existed between the advanced frontier and full settlement; ... a
moving place of transition" (p. xii).
The Ewings established several trading sites over northern Indiana and within
two decades had extended their operations into western Iowa and eastern Kansas.
The magnitude of their Indian trade activities was second only to that of Pierre
Chouteau, Jr., who projected generally further westward. At the same time, they
maintained large mercantile and real estate holdings in Indiana besides considerable property and bank stock at St. Louis. They also became politically and
socially prominent.
Weathering the stormy changes in national politics and the attendant vagaries
of Indian policy in the 1840s, the Ewings emerged as "probably the single most
influential force in the determination of federal Indian policy" (p. 175). They
decided removal schedules, influenced treaty negotiations, controlled tribal money
expenditures, selected Indian agents, and effectively silenced their opposition.
Trouble and uncertainty soon plagued the House of Ewing. Success had engendered complacency and carelessness. Looking for new ways of securing Indian
money they began to serve as tribal attorneys in negotiations with the government.
They even considered the lure of western trade opportunities such as that offered
by the California gold fields. The national elections of 1852 again put them on
the other side of the political fence. They did not believe the new Democratic
administration was hostile to their company, but its uncompromising and strict
attitude towards traders made the outlook for future profit rather bleak. The firm
began a general withdrawal and retrenchment. William's death marked the virtual
end of the significance of the House of Ewing in Indian affairs.
This is an important monographic case study of aggressive merchant-capitalists
whose immense power dominated Indian trade and Indian policy. In their day,
the Ewings were regarded as public benefactors, serving the needs of Indians
and government in a high-risk business. They were more influential and successful
in it than most of their contemporaries. Robert Trennert's lucidly written and
superbly documented account of this intricate story necessitates revision of much
conventional wisdom on the subject.

Miami University

DWIGHT L. SMITH

SHUCKS, SHOCKS, AND HOMINY BLOCKS: CORN AS A WAY OF LIFE IN PIONEER
AMERICA. By Nicholas P. Hardeman. Drawings by Linda M. Steele. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. Pp. xii, 271. Illus., bibliog.,
index, epilogue. $20.00.
THIS VOLUME ADEQUATELY fulfills the promise of its subtitle. It is a folkloric account
of the pervasive impact of corn on the social, political, and economic development
of at least some sections of the frontier United States.
Hardeman approaches his topic chronologically and topically. Early chapters
review the domestication of corn by Indians and initial European encounters with
it, although the author points out that his major purpose is to consider pioneer
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interaction with corn primarily in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries. Ten
of the book's eighteen chapters trace folkways with corn from seedbed to harvest
to consumption as food and drink. An excellent chapter, "Jack of All Aids," details
the myriad uses for cobs, shucks, and stalks. Final chapters on corn and cornrelated activities in liter~ture and the corn-livestock relationship are lightweight
reviews best suited to textbooks.
Scholars and readers of southwestern history or the history of the American
West will find little for consideration in the work. Hardeman's pioneers are primarily fixed on the Appalachian and Southern farming frontiers. Hispanic encounters with corn are confined to the well-known accounts of various explorers.
Corn culture in New Mexico receives about a dozen references of one or two
paragraphs each, with much of the material drawn from Josiah Gregg's Commerce
of the Prairies, though specific reference to that account is lacking in the text or
bibliography. These New Mexico items are chiefly of the "they ate posole, drank
atole and had gristmills" variety. Even less attention is given the Far West, with
a few references to California, and none to the struggle in growing corn European
peoples experienced in the Pacific Northwest.
While Hardeman does retrieve a fund of ephemeral information on corn in its
many guises, his presentation is seriously marred by a lack of citation. Even direct
quotations are sometimes not acknowledged (p. 146). The bibliography, while
admittedly not exhaustive, is uneven with, for instance, mention of three of the
admirable specialized bibliographies published by the Agricultural History Center
at the University of California, Davis, but the exclusion of others, some of which,
such as The History of Agriculture in the Midwest, are certainly pertinent. The
book also could have been better edited, given the many instances where the
author repeats information previously considered, sometimes within a few pages
of the initial comment.
As these deficiencies indicate, the work has limitations for scholars and other
well-informed students of American agriculture; as a compendium of information
on "corn as a way of life" it makes for pleasant reading. Dozens of delightful
illustrations enhance the text and complement the book's pleasing design.

New Mexico Highlands University

MICHAEL L. OLSEN

ENERGY FROM THE WEST: A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. By the Science and Public Policy Program, University
of Oklahoma. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981. Pp. XVii, 362. Illus.,
notes, tables, references, index. $25.00 cloth; $9.95 paper.
WITHIN THE LAST DECADE the literature concerning energy development in the
West has grown by leaps and bounds. Although much of it is oriented to the very
recent past and is not in any sense historical, nevertheless the corpus of books
and articles that have appeared since the Arab oil embargo of 1973 is of interest
to historians because it provides new data and raises questions that they need to
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consider if the energy problems of the 1980s are to be placed in historical perspective.
This volume, a product of the University of Oklahoma's Science and Public
Policy Program, is a result of a team effort by political scientists, economists, and
other social scientists to assess western energy resource development during the
past ten years. After providing a general overview of energy development in the
region, individual authors deal more specifically with problems relating to water,
air quality, and land use. Other chapters deal with issues concerning housing,
availability of capital, the transport of energy, and the establishment of sites for
energy facilities. In their conclusions the authors carefully organize their recommendations in the hope that they will affect policy makers on various levels,
particularly those working in local, state, and federal agencies, and for Indian
tribes. Their conclusions seem apt and worthy of consideration. In summing up,
they emphasize the complex and often conflicting elements comprising energy
problems in the western states that will not make solutions easy. "While many of
these issues are manageable," they note, "they will require a mix of technical,
legal, and institutional responses" (p. 350).
Historians interested in the Southwest will find this to be an informative volume,
useful for gaining a fuller understanding of the energy crisis of the 1980s. Particularly helpful are the bibliographies at the conclusion of each chapter that can
serve as a practical guide to the writings on energy development in the West
during the past five years. Readers of this book should not expect a historical
analysis, however. The purpose of the authors was to provide a contemporary
appraisal of western energy problems as viewed by behavioral scientists. In that
endeavor they have succeeded.
University of New Mexico

GERALD D. NASH

LEW WALLACE: MILITANT ROMANTIC. By Robert E. Morsberger and Katharine
M. Morsberger. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981. Pp. xii, 560.
Illus., bibliog., index, notes. $17.95.
LEW WALLACE WAS ONE of those people who do supremely well at one thing and
more or less botch nearly everything else they attempt. His single great achievement was the writing of Ben-Hur, one of the most successful historical novels
ever published. By contrast, he had a lackluster career in the law, a profession
that bored him; he met with failure in his tries at getting into Congress; he spent
the Mexican War complaining about his superiors and the inaction they consigned
him to; in the Civil War he arrived too late on the field at Shiloh and was blamed
(perhaps unjustly) for his tardiness; at Monocacy he managed to hold off the
Confederate advance until reinforcements could arrive to protect Washington but
nonetheless lost the battle; despite political influence, he missed out on the most
desirable diplomatic posts and had to settle for Turkey, then in the backwaters of
world affairs; and his only son proved to be a person of mediocre ability, needing
steady direction from his father.
Given such unpromising material, a biograher might be pardoned for coming
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up with a second-rate product. Happily, however, the Morsbergers have turned
out an excellent study of their subject. Wallace was a prolific letter-writer, keeper
of diaries, and preserver of all sorts of records, and his biographers have waded
through immense quantities of such stuff, extracted the essential facts, and presented them in a readable, informative manner worthy of a more deserving subject.
New Mexico readers will find much of interest in the chapter "Outlaws and
Apaches," which deals with Wallace's three years as governor of the territory.
Attention is given to the Lincoln County War, the machinations of the Santa Fe
Ring, and the efforts to suppress the raids by Victorio and other Apache leaders.
The Morsbergers probably give Wallace more credit than he deserves for his
handling of these problems. The Lincoln County War did sputter to an end during
his term as governor, but this may have happened because most of the leaders
of both factions had been killed off by then. Victorio was killed by Mexican forces,
and, in any case, the Apache troubles continued after Wallace had left the Palace
of the Governors. Possibly his most valuable service as chief executive was the
rescue and preservation of the New Mexico archives, which had been neglected
under previous administrations and but for his efforts might have been utterly
lost.
The book's chief merits stem from the mass of factual information about Wallace
that the authors have assembled and presented. It is not properly a critical biography. Although Wallace's faults are not disregarded, they are underplayed. For
example, the authors concede his vindictiveness as a member of the military court
that tried and convicted the people implicated in the assassination of Abraham
Lincoln, but they try to make out as good a case for him as they can. More
surprisingly, though they provide a wealth of evidence to show the great popular
success of Ben-Bur, they say little about why the book met with a cool reception
from critics then and has been largely forgotten in the century since it was published, or about why Wallace's other novels have slipped even deeper into oblivion.
Apart from these deficiencies, which are scarcely fatal, the only serious criticism
that can be made of the book is that its subject does not really deserve a 560page biography, the product of a dozen years of research and writing by two
people. Not only is the kind of fiction he wrote out of fashion, but the type of
personality he represents would, if it appeared in a public figure today, be perceived-eorrectly-as a dangerous anachronism. It is true, however, that Wallace
had at least tangential contact with several major events of the nineteenth century
and that hence a comprehensive biography of the man can contribute to our
understanding of his times. From the fact that he was the object of a certain
amount of hero-worship we can infer something about what nineteenth-century
Americans expected in the way of a hero. And the present reputation of his novels,
contrasted with the fame they enjoyed during his lifetime, can tell us a good deal
about changing literary tastes among the mass of readers. Perhaps such revelations
are justification enough for the labors endured by the Morsbergers in their efforts
to tell everything that anyone would want to know about Gen. Lew Wallace.

Mankato State University

RoyW.

MEYER
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SADDLES. By Russel H. Beatie. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981.
Pp. xv, 391. Illus., appendix, index, bibliog. $35.00.
RUSSEL BEATIE'S Saddles is the first comprehensive study of the western stock
saddle. It is a long overdue addition to the literature of the American cattle
industry. A saddle is a cowboy's most important piece of equipment. Phillip Ashton
Rollins described it as the cowboy's workbench. While a cowpuncher might dispense with hat, spurs, chaps, or high-heeled boots, the exigencies of working
cattle on horseback require that he ride a heavy stock saddle.
Beatie, an accomplished horseman and avid saddle collector, explores all aspects
of the cowboy saddle. He surveys its evolution and development from pr~historic
to modern times, placing special emphasis on important style and design modifications since the Civil War. He reviews in detail saddle parts and saddle construction. In a chapter designed for beginning riders, he discusses the basics of
western horsemanship, what he terms the dynamics of riding, and the special
relationship between horse, saddle, and rider.
The concise text is enhanced by more than eight hundred photographs and
drawings. The reproductions of historic and modern saddles serve well to indicate
changing styles of saddle decoration. An entertaining section entitled "Saddles as
History and Art" illustrates the stock saddle in its highest form of decoration.
Although the saddles shown are functional equivalents to working cowboy "rigs,"
they are distinguished by their famous owners and unusual and exquisite decoration.
The bibliography, consisting of pertinent works dealing with horses, saddles,
and tack, is exceptional. Curators and researchers will find it useful and detailed.
In the appendix, the author lists by state many famous saddlemakers and saddle
companies of the West and the period of their active operation. This is the first
such compilation.
Cowboys spend much time reading and consulting saddle catalogs when choosing new saddles. Saddles could be described as the ultimate saddle catalog. It
will soon find its way into bunkhouses throughout the West.

Philmont Scout Ranch

STEPHEN ZIMMER

REMINISCENCES OF Los ALAMOS, 1943-1945. Edited by Lawrence Badash, Joseph
O. Hirschfelder, and Herbert P. Broida. Studies in the History of Modern
Science, vol. 5. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980. Pp.
xxi, 188. Index, notes, biographical notes. $10.95 paper.
REMINISCENCES OF Los ALAMOS, 1943-1945 is based on a series of informallectures delivered by a dozen prominent scientists and their wives at the University
of California, Santa Barbara, in 1975. Unlike other scientific lectures, these had
nothing to do with recent experimentation or advanced scientific thought. Instead,
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these men and women spoke of their key roles in the highly secretive project to
develop the world's first atomic bomb in remote Los Alamos, New Mexico, during
World War II.
These personal recollections make for fascinating reading. Nearly every phase
of the Manhattan Project is described in considerable detail: from the original
selection of the far-off site in the mountains to the careful recruitment of top
scientists in a wide range of technical fields; from the clever procurement of scarce
resources to the ingenious practical application of nuclear theory by Robert Oppenheimer and his fellow scientists; from the difficult problem of maintaining
tight security in a free-thinking community to the urgent need to test the atomic
bomb at Trinity precisely on 16 July 1945, because President Truman "needed to
know the outcome of Trinity to use in his Potsdam negotiations with Stalin and
Churchill the following day."
Taken together, these lectures tell the history of a great race to create an
"ultimate weapon," at first before the Germans devised a similar weapon, later
before the course of events necessitated a bloody invasion of mainland Japan, and,
finally, before the Soviet Union swept any further into Eastern Europe after the
fall of Nazi Germany. Convinced that "the whole fate of the civilized world depended on our succeeding," few of the scientists gave much thought to the longrange effect of their work until after their invention succeeded and thousands of
Japanese lay dead in the ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The scientists at Los
Alamos had done what had been asked of them in the heat of battle and had
never questioned their mission until the smoke had cleared and an ungrateful
world looked on their ultimate weapon with scorn and great fear. Reacting much
like soldiers home from the front, the scientists recalled their wartime experience
on The Hill with a mixture of pride, nostalgia, and considerable shock at the
world's vehement reaction to their labor when their sole motivation had been to
serve their country and "help win the war to end all wars."
Despite these insights, Reminiscences of Los Alamos has its flaws. One must
wonder, for example, why only scientists and their wives were asked to contribute
their recollections at Santa Barbara when Indians from San Ildefonso, Hispanics
from Espanola, and GIs from every state in the Union also worked in Los Alamos
during this critical period. Serving as maids, store clerks, construction workers,
security guards, and in sundry other capacities, these individuals had entirely
different views of the top secret town and its early development. Few could tell
us much about the scientific discoveries that took place on The Hill, but they
contributed in many other ways and could add a great deal of information about
lesser-known episodes, such as the aborted labor strike that momentarily threatened the entire Manhattan Project until it was decisively settled by the military
in 1944. The inclusion of similar recollections from this forgotten segment of the
Los Alamos population would have added a new dimension to an already valuable
new book.

University of New Mexico

RICHARD MELZER
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COREY LANE. By Norman Zollinger. New Haven, Conn.: Ticknor and Fields,
1981. Pp. 393. $13.95.
NORMAN ZOLLINGER'S Riders to Cibola was a competent first novel but only now,
with the publication of his second novel, can we see how much the author learned
about his craft while writing-and later ruminating about?-his earlier work. As
a piece of fiction, Corey Lane is far superior to Riders. Its plot is better structured
and more engrossing; its characters are more interesting and convincing (except
for the title-character whose pathological behavior is not Zollinger's "fault"). The
narrative is firmer and more controlled (most of the events and the relations
among people are seen from the point of view of the young editor of a small town
newspaper who has come from New York to New Mexico). Also, the quality of
writing in Corey Lane-style and tone-reveals the hand of an author who has
acquired greater fluency and ease.
As the dust jacket of Corey Lane hints (and as Zollinger has made clear in
interviews), the story line follows rather closely-and quite skillfully-the plot of
Shakespeare's Coriolanus. Each chapter is headed by an epigraph taken from the
tragedy's text, an epigraph that is subsequently developed in terms of theme,
plot, and character. Moreover, most of the novel's major characters correspond
to those in Shakespeare's play.
The novel begins in the New Mexico territory of 1879. Corey Lane, the local
Coriolanus, is the sheriff of Chupadera County (fictitious) with an office in the
town of Black Springs (also fictitious), situated in the Ojos Negros basin (the same
rugged country in which Riders to Cibola is set). With little more than a stare
from his hard blue eyes, Lane preserves order among feuding ranchers, farmers,
and merchants. Naturally, he takes command of a small force of these same citizens
when his town is threatened by marauding Apaches headed by the notorious
Victorio (the southwestern counterpart of Shakespeare's Tullus Aufidius, general
of the Volsces and rival of Coriolanus who hates and admires him). Lane returns
in triumph to Black Springs where he chides the townspeople for praising him.
"What the hell is all this? ... You people know by now that I can't abide this
kind of nonsense."
Paradoxically, the "kind of nonsense" Corey Lane cannot abide-praise and
adulation-is precisely what he needs to nourish his colossal pride. Eventually,
when his ego is bruised by his fellows, he, like Coriolanus before him, turns on
them and joins their bitterest enemy (Victorio) to crush them. If Lane's defection
seems poorly motivated, it is because the magnitude of his pride and arrogance
is incomprehensible to most people. Zollinger follows Shakespeare in making his
tragic hero the victim of his own pathological excesses.
Appropriately, the novel ends with a quotation from Shakespeare-not from
Coriolanus but Richard II-as the editor-narrator goes to the cemetery where
his and Corey's old friend is buried, "to sit upon the ground and tell sad stories
of the death of kings.... " Corey Lane and Victorio, kings of a sort, are not easily
forgotten.

University of New Mexico
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